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Using the income tax system as 
your hedge counterparty
Tim Edgar* and Amir Aghdaei**
Abstract
A strain of the academic literature on taxation and risk taking emphasises the income 
effect and consequent transfer of risk to government through the income tax system 
in the presence of scaling of risky positions. The policy implications of this literature 
have been explored in considerable detail, although the practical significance for tax 
policymakers is ambiguous given the tax and non-tax constraints on scaling under 
the personal income tax. In contrast, fragmentary transactional evidence suggests 
that scaling of risky positions may have its most practical application in the context of 
corporate hedging transactions where many of the same tax and non-tax constraints 
do not apply. In fact, risk-transfer transactions in this very different context have been 
the subject of some recent attention by tax policymakers and tax administrators. 
This paper explores the case for, and design of, a loss limitation intended to address 
the transfer of risk to government that otherwise is the result of hedged positions 
that are scaled to provide imperfectly offsetting pre-tax cash flows but perfectly (or 
near perfectly) offsetting after-tax cash flows. Although the case for such a limitation 
extends broadly to the entire range of such transactions, perceptions of costliness 
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associated with the identification exercise, as well as perceptions of a negative 
impact on the decision to hedge, may lead to a more narrowly focused loss limitation 
patterned on legislation recently adopted by UK Inland Revenue. For the much more 
limited subset of risk-transfer transactions that are entered into for the purpose of 
providing a tax benefit, narrowly construed, general anti-tax avoidance rules and/or 
doctrines can provide an effective response. An example of this type of transaction is 
the asymmetric swap that is the subject of a taxation determination released by the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO).
I Introduction
In Taxation Determination TD 2010/12,1 the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) ruled 
that the general anti-avoidance rule in Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(ITAA 1936) can apply to an asymmetric swap scheme. These schemes, implemented 
by a number of Australian banks, received some attention in the popular press2 when 
the ATO first released Draft Taxation Determination TD 2009/D12,3 the predecessor to 
TD 2010/12. But the asymmetric swap that is the subject of this taxation determination 
is only one particular example of a broader set of transactions structured to transfer 
market risk to government through the income tax system. In fact, we understand 
that the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and the US Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) are both currently examining similar transactions under audit. It is perhaps 
not surprising, therefore, that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has also recently released a report highlighting the revenue 
threat from these transactions and canvassing possible responses.4 Such transactions 
are sometimes referred to as “after-tax hedging” or “over-hedging”/“under-hedging.” 
1 ATO, Taxation Determination TD 2010/12, “Income tax: can Part IVA of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 apply to an asymmetric swap scheme?” 28 April 2010.
2 See, for example, Richard Gluyas, “ATO Targets Banks’ Swap Deals” The Australian, 7 November 
2009. See also Ben Butler and Eric Johnston, “MacBank’s $250m Tax Perk at Risk” Sydney 
Morning Herald, 11 April 2011.
3 ATO, Taxation Determination TD 2009/D12, “Income tax: can Part IVA of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 apply to an asymmetric swap scheme?” 14 October 2009.
4 OECD, Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-Tax Hedging (Paris: OECD, March 2013), at 3 
and 7 (suggesting that hundreds of millions of USD revenue is at risk because of aggressive 
tax planning transactions based on after-tax hedging, with member countries identifying a 
number of multi-billion USD transactions). See also OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation through 
Aggressive Tax Planning (Paris: OECD, August 2011), at 51-52 (describing certain after-tax 
hedging transactions intended to transfer losses from low-tax to high-tax jurisdictions). There 
is no mention of the subject of after-tax hedging in the discussion paper, recently released 
by Australian Treasury, on proposed amendments to the taxation of financial arrangements 
(TOFA) tax hedging rules in subdivision 230-E of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1997 (ITAA 
1997). See Australian Treasury Department, Improving the Operation of the Tax Hedging 
Provisions (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Discussion Paper, February 2012). But see 
also Australian Treasury Department, Budget Measures 2013-14 – Part 1: Revenue Measures 
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But to better convey the associated policy problem, we use the term “risk-transfer 
transactions” to describe these transactions. Although this term could also include 
transactions that transfer price risk through the market, we use the conventional term 
“hedge transaction” to distinguish them from those transactions that are the focus of 
this article. 
In contrast with the ATO’s reliance on Part IVA, UK Inland Revenue has recently 
targeted a subset of risk-transfer transactions (referred to as “risk-transfer schemes”) 
with the application of a loss limitation.5 Although the focus of this legislative response 
is a broader set of transactions than the asymmetric swap considered in TD 2010/12, 
the ability to use government as an involuntary hedge counterparty through the 
income tax system is not limited to either the kinds of transactions that are the focus 
of the ATO taxation determination or the narrowly targeted loss limitation adopted in 
the United Kingdom. An income tax environment characterised by fixed asymmetric 
tax rates and non-binding loss limitations permits such risk transfer through scaling 
of the magnitude of pre-tax positions in a manner that provides imperfectly offsetting 
pre-tax cash flows but an effective after-tax hedge (that is, perfectly, or near perfectly, 
offsetting after-tax gain and loss). In short, with asymmetric tax rates, non-binding 
loss limitations and scaling of offsetting long and short positions, government can be 
made to bear the entirety of the relevant market risk reflected in the net tax liability 
associated with the offsetting positions. 
There is surprisingly very little tax literature on scaling of positions in a hedge context. 
With the exception of the recent OECD report, noted above,6 what literature that does 
exist tends to be technical in its focus and ignores any associated policy problem.7 
We emphasise that a generalised ability for corporate taxpayers to use the income tax 
system as their involuntary hedge counterparty presents a policy problem that requires 
an income-tax based response, preferably in the form of a loss limitation applicable to 
risk-transfer transactions generally and not just the subset of such transactions that 
are the focus of the UK legislative response. We suggest that a broad loss limitation 
applicable to risk-transfer transactions generally is preferable, primarily because of the 
entirely random incidence that is the result of the conditions required to facilitate such 
transactions. These conditions provide absolutely no normatively compelling rationale 
that would justify an acceptance of risk-transfer transactions by policymakers. 
Ideally, the kind of broad loss limitation we propose would be combined with a hedge 
tax accounting regime, which may mute, to some extent at least, the substitution of 
risk transfer through the income tax system for risk transfer through the market. 
(Paper 2) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 14 May 2013), at 34-35 (indicating pending 
amendments to the Offshore Banking Unit (OBU) regime to address unspecified integrity issues, 
which could extend to risk-transfer transactions effected through OBUs).
5 UK Finance Act 2010, section 46 and schedule 16 enacting Part 21A, sections 937A to 937O, of 
the Corporation Tax Act 2010 applicable to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 April 2010.
6 Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4.
7 See, for example, Michael Feder, “After-Tax Hedging” (2010) 126 Tax Notes 1613 (describing 
circumstances in which income tax liabilities can be used to hedge risk).
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However, such a regime tends to be limited to the provision of symmetric timing and 
character recognition of gain and loss associated with offsetting pre-tax positions; it 
also tends to be less than comprehensive in failing to apply in a cross-border context, 
and in some cases is elective.8 As a result, one of the conditions required for the 
implementation of risk-transfer transactions – fixed asymmetric tax rates – holds 
for a broad range of corporate taxpayers, including financial institutions subject to 
mark-to-market recognition of gain or loss on non-capital account for traded assets 
and derivative instruments.9 A broad loss limitation is arguably required, therefore, 
because of the incompleteness of application of hedge tax accounting regimes, leaving 
a range of corporate taxpayers with an effective option to transfer risk through the 
income tax system rather than the market. The same loss limitation rule is also 
required in the absence of a hedge tax accounting regime, since taxpayers retain the 
same option in this legislative environment.
Despite the policy case for the adoption of a broad loss limitation, perceived 
compliance and administrative costs associated with the identification of a wide set of 
problematic transactions, as well as perceptions of a negative impact on the decision 
to hedge risk,10 may lead tax administrators and policymakers to distinguish: 
• risk-transfer transactions that do not provide a financial benefit other
than the transfer of risk;
8 The hedge tax accounting regime in ITAA 1997, subdivision 230-E reflects these features. 
Because it affects only timing and character of the recognition of gain and loss when taxpayers 
elect to have it apply, the Commissioner’s discretion to treat offsetting positions as a hedge in the 
absence of a designation by the taxpayer would not disturb the effect of scaling in the presence 
of asymmetric tax rates. See ITAA 1997, section 230-345 (permitting the Commissioner, under 
certain conditions, to make a determination that the requirements of a hedge are met). The US 
hedge tax accounting regime providing character matching of gain and loss includes a “failed 
hedge rule,” which ensures that a taxpayer may not avoid non-capital treatment by failing to 
identify transactions that are clearly hedge transactions. In the absence of a reasonable basis for 
failing to identify a hedge transaction, gain (but not loss) may be treated as ordinary income. 
See Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Reg. section 1221-2(f)(2)(iii); and Edward D. Kleinbard and 
Suzanne F. Greenberg, “Business Hedges After Arkansas Best” (1988) 43 Tax Law Review 393.
9 See, in this respect, Edward D. Kleinbard and Thomas L. Evans, “The Role of Mark-to-Market 
Accounting in a Realization-Based Tax System” (1997) 75 Taxes: The Tax Magazine 788 
(characterising the application of mark-to-market reporting to the inventory of traders or 
dealers in securities as a substitute for a hedge accounting regime); and the elective financial 
reports method in ITAA 1997, subdivision 230-F and/or the elective fair value method in ITAA 
1997, subdivision 230-C.
10 See, HM Revenue and Customs, “Technical Note on Overhedging and Underhedging,” 10 August 
2009, at 5 (“The Government recognises that there will be situations where groups are seeking 
to undertake commercial hedging transactions not covered by the present tax neutral hedging 
provisions. Where such situations arise there is no intention to prevent groups from undertaking 
overhedging or underhedging transactions where this is the only realistic way to provide an 
effective post tax hedge of the risk in question.”). See also Aggressive Tax Planning based on 
After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 35 (suggesting that there is a policy-relevant distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable after-tax hedging).
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• risk-transfer transactions that provide a financial benefit other than the 
transfer of risk or a tax benefit; and 
• risk-transfer transactions that provide a tax benefit. 
Costliness of the identification exercise is particularly severe in a cross-border context, 
which commonly provides asymmetric tax rates necessary for scaling of offsetting 
positions and the consequent transfer of risk through the income tax system. Where 
a hedge tax accounting regime provides symmetric tax treatment for domestic 
transactions, the same identification exercise may not be as severe; yet tax policymakers 
may be willing to tolerate a range of risk-transfer transactions on an apparent empirical 
assumption that their implementation is limited. The same tolerance by policymakers, 
perhaps based on the same empirical assumption, is evident in those jurisdictions 
where a hedge tax accounting regime has not been adopted. 
To the extent that risk-transfer transactions have been the subject of any response 
by tax policymakers and tax administrators, the apparent focus is what appears, 
intuitively at least, to be the more egregious transactions involving the transfer of risk 
through the income tax system and the provision of an additional financial advantage 
or a tax benefit. For the former type of risk-transfer transaction, a narrow loss 
limitation along the lines of that adopted in the United Kingdom is defensible. For 
the latter type of risk-transfer transaction, general anti-tax-avoidance rules or anti-
tax-avoidance doctrines can provide an effective and defensible response. Indeed, 
because risk-transfer transactions of this type are nothing more than a particular 
example of tax-avoidance transactions, the effectiveness of the response depends on a 
characterisation of such transactions as carried out for the purpose of providing a tax 
benefit. Negating the transfer of risk to government through the income tax system 
is an entirely incidental effect of the application of general anti-tax-avoidance rules 
and/or doctrines.
Part two begins with a description of three representative risk-transfer transactions 
illustrating, at a general level, the shared features of such transactions. Part three 
follows with an articulation of the policy problem that is common to risk-transfer 
transactions. This part draws on the academic literature on taxation and risk taking 
which, despite a different focus, highlights the fact that the generalised policy problem 
presented by risk-transfer transactions is not unique to the subset of such transactions 
that, to date, have been the limited target of tax policymakers and tax administrators. 
Part four explores the design of a loss limitation applicable to risk-transfer transactions 
generally. The suggested design features are contrasted with the UK loss limitation, 
which targets the narrower range of risk-transfer transactions that provide a financial 
benefit other than a tax benefit and the transfer of risk through the income tax system. 
Part five concludes with a discussion of the application of general anti-tax-avoidance 
rules and/or doctrines to the even narrower range of risk-transfer transactions that 
are entered into to provide a tax benefit. The reasoning in TD 2010/12 is critiqued as 
an example of the kind of conceptual and factual difficulties of application that arise 
in this context.
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II Illustrative Risk-Transfer Transactions
A risk-transfer transaction is designed to substitute for another transaction in which 
a taxpayer would otherwise: 
• hedge market risk on a pre-tax basis by entering into short and long 
positions11 with offsetting pre-tax cash flows; or
• assume the market risk associated with an unhedged short or long 
position. 
In the former instance, symmetric treatment of the offsetting short and long positions 
ensures that no net tax is payable. In the latter instance, gain or loss is recognised at 
the relevant tax rate and government shares the risk associated with the unhedged 
position in proportion to that rate. 
As hedge transaction substitutes, risk-transfer transactions share four features. First, 
they are structured to split offsetting short and long positions such that the two 
positions are treated differently. Second, the magnitude of the offsetting positions are 
adjusted or scaled such that the pre-tax cash flows offset imperfectly. Third, scaling 
ensures that the after-tax cash flows offset perfectly once gain and loss is subject 
to the different treatment or, alternatively, that the market risk associated with an 
unhedged position is eliminated. Fourth, government effectively assumes the market 
risk reflected in the net tax liability associated with the imperfect pre-tax offset. In the 
absence of adjustment of offsetting short and long positions to account for different 
tax rates, market risk would be borne by market participants, with government 
sharing that risk as a function of the relevant tax rates.
Each of these features of risk-transfer transactions is illustrated below. The first two 
transactions are foreign-currency hedges described in a technical note released by UK 
Inland Revenue in August 2009 in advance of the introduction of legislation intended 
to address these and other similar transactions.12 The third example is an asymmetric 
swap, which is the subject of TD 2010/12.13
11 An investor is “long in an asset” if he or she owns the asset or has the right or obligation to 
purchase it. In that case, the investor benefits if the asset appreciates in value and loses if the asset 
depreciates. An investor is “short in an asset” if he or she has sold the asset or has the right or 
obligation to sell in the future. In that case, the investor benefits from any depreciation in value 
of the asset and loses if the asset appreciates.
12 Technical Note, supra note 10. See also Feder, supra note 7; and Aggressive Tax Planning based 
on After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 18-19.
13 See also Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 24-27.
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A Foreign-Currency Hedging
Example 1
Aco and Bco are members of the same corporate Group X and subject to a 28 percent 
tax rate. Aco invests 100m sterling (GBP) in yen-denominated (JPY) shares of a 
subsidiary, Subco. Group X would like to eliminate exchange rate risk attributable to 
depreciation of the JPY against GBP while also benefitting from yen interest rates that 
are significantly lower than GBP interest rates. To realize these goals, Bco borrows the 
JPY-equivalent of 139m GBP.
Figure 1
Aco
Subco
Bco
100m GBP
JPY-denominated
shares
139m GBP
JPY-denominated
borrowing 
The hedge in example 1 is structured to provide asymmetric tax treatment of offsetting 
positions in the form of a timing mismatch. Foreign exchange gain or loss on the yen-
denominated shares of Subco held by Aco is brought to account on realisation, while 
offsetting loss or gain on the yen borrowing of Bco is brought to account annually on 
the retranslation basis. At an assumed corporate income tax rate of 28 percent, the yen 
borrowing is scaled up to the yen-equivalent of 139m sterling (100m x 100m/72m = 
139m) to provide a complete after-tax offset of unrealized gain or loss on the shares 
of Subco. The combination of the asymmetric tax treatment of the offsetting positions 
and the scaling up of the pre-tax borrowing allows Group X to borrow at the lower 
yen interest rate while eliminating exchange rate risk, which is effectively transferred 
to government through the income tax system. Under various changes in the sterling/
yen exchange rate, this result is summarised in table 1.1.
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Table 1.1
GBP/JPY -30% -20% -10% -5% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Bco: FX gain/loss 
on JPY borrowing
(41.70) (27.80) (13.90) (6.95) 6.95 13.90 27.80 41.70
Tax payable (11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
Net after-tax (30) (20) (10) (5) 5 10 20 30
Aco: FX gain/loss 
Subco shares
30 20 10 5 (5) (10) (20) (30)
Tax payable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net after-tax 30 20 10 5 (5) (10) (20) (30)
Consolidated 
after-tax
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net revenue (11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
As an alternative to the hedge provided by the transaction in example 1, Aco could 
borrow yen equal to the sterling amount of its yen-denominated shares. Provided that 
foreign exchange gain or loss on the borrowing is taxed symmetrically with foreign 
exchange loss or gain on the yen-denominated shares, both the pre-tax and after-tax 
result would be no net gain or loss and no net revenue payable to government. This 
result is summarised in table 1.2. 
Table 1.2
GBP/JPY -30% -20% -10% -5% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Aco: FX gain/
loss on shares 
of Subco
30 20 10 5 (5) (10) (20) (30)
Aco: FX gain/
loss on JPY 
borrowing
(30) (20) (10) (5) 5 10 20 30
Net revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Example 2
Bankco and Holdco are members of the same corporate Group Y and subject to a 
28 percent tax rate. Holdco invests the JPY-equivalent of 100m GBP in a limited 
partnership that invests in JPY-denominated bonds. Holdco then enters into: (i) 
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a currency swap with Bankco with a notional principal amount of 100m GBP; and 
(ii) a forward currency contract with Bankco in the amount of 39m GBP. Under both 
the currency swap and forward currency contract, Holdco agrees to sell JPY for GBP 
at the current spot rate and also receives the difference between JPY and the higher 
GBP interest rates. Bankco offsets its positions with Holdco by entering into a mirror 
currency swap and forward contract in the market whereby it agrees to sell JPY for GBP.
Figure 2
Bankco
LP
(JPY)
Market
Holdco Partners
currency
swap
currency
swap
forward
forward
JPY Bonds
As with the transaction in example 1, the hedge in example 2 is structured to provide 
asymmetric tax treatment of offsetting positions in the form of a timing mismatch. 
Foreign exchange gain or loss on the yen-denominated bonds held by Holdco through 
its limited partnership interest is brought to account on realisation in the form of gain 
or loss allocated to Holdco.14 Offsetting loss or gain on the currency swap and the 
forward contract with Bankco is brought to account on the closing out of the contracts, 
14 Technical Note, supra note 10, at 5 (indicating that JPY is the functional currency of the limited 
partnership so that any exchange gain or loss on the bonds will not be recognised).
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which will precede realisation on the bonds.15 At an assumed corporate income tax 
rate of 28 percent, the forward contract is used to scale up Holdco’s foreign exchange 
position to the yen-equivalent of 139m sterling (100m x 100m/72m = 139m), which 
provides a complete after-tax offset of unrealised gain or loss on the yen-denominated 
bonds through the limited partnership interest. Under various changes in the sterling/
yen exchange rate, the after-tax position of Holdco is summarised in table 2.1.
Table 2.1
GBP/JPY -30% -20% -10% -5% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Holdco: FX gain/
loss currency swap
(30) (20) (10) (5) 5 10 20 30
Tax payable (8.40) (5.60) (2.80) (1.40) 1.40 2.80 5.60 8.40
Holdco: FX gain/
loss forward
(11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
Tax payable (3.30) (2.20) (1.10) (0.55) 0.55 1.10 2.20 3.30
Net after-tax (30) (20) (10) (5) 5 10 20 30
Holdco: FX gain/
loss JPY bond
30 20 10 5 (5) (10) (20) (30)
Tax payable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net after-tax 30 20 10 5 (5) (10) (20) (30)
Because of its mirror positions under the currency swap and forward with Holdco and 
the market, Bankco is perfectly hedged, both pre-tax and after-tax, and will realise no 
net gain or loss. This result is summarised in table 2.2.
15 See Technical Note, supra note 10, at 5 (indicating that Holdco is accounting under old UK 
GAAP and is treating the currency swap as a hedge of the limited partnership interest brought 
to account on realisation. The principal amount on the forward contract is treated as a hedge of 
the tax on the currency swap and is brought to account when the tax on the currency swap is 
brought to account).
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Table 2.2
GBP/JPY -30% -20% -10% -5% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Bankco: FX 
gain/loss with 
Holdco
30 20 10 5 (5) (10) (20) (30)
Bankco: FX 
gain/loss with 
market
(30) (20) (10) (5) 5 10 20 30
Net after-tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The hedge in example 2 differs from the hedge in example 1 in the form of the benefit 
realised by the corporate group. The combination of the asymmetric tax treatment 
of the offsetting positions and the scaling up of the pre-tax foreign exchange 
position allows Group Y to earn a return greater than the sterling interest rate while 
eliminating exchange rate risk. This result is realised because of the off-market pricing 
of the currency swap and the forward. In particular, the exchange rate under both 
contracts is the spot exchange rate rather than a forward exchange rate that, in theory, 
reflects the interest rate differential of the two currencies.16 To bring the contracts on-
market, Bankco will receive, under its contracts with the market, the present value of 
the interest rate differential between the stronger yen and the weaker sterling. Bankco 
must pay the same amount to Holdco under its off-market currency swap and forward 
contract with Holdco, which can invest the prepayment at the sterling interest rate. 
Holdco will thereby earn the lower interest rate on the yen-denominated bonds, plus 
the sterling interest rate on the prepayment under the currency swap and forward 
contract, while eliminating its exchange rate risk. The total exceeds what would 
otherwise be interest earned on a sterling-denominated bond in the amount of 100m 
or, alternatively, interest plus expected foreign exchange gain on a yen-denominated 
bond where unexpected gain or loss is hedged by Holdco selling yen forward at the 
forward exchange rate. 
As with the hedge in example 1, exchange rate risk otherwise borne by Group Y is 
effectively transferred to government through the income tax system. This result is 
summarised in table 2.3.
16 The arbitrage pricing relationship, known as “covered interest-rate parity,” holds that the 
difference between forward and spot exchange rates for two currencies must equal the difference 
between interest rates for borrowings/loans in the same currencies. This equivalence ensures 
that a borrowing/loan in a weak currency yields the same return as an equivalent borrowing/
loan in a stronger currency. Covered interest-rate parity is expressed as:
 Ef/Es = (1 + ir)/(1 + id)
 where Es is the spot exchange rate for two currencies; Ef is the forward exchange rate; ir is the 
interest rate for the foreign currency; and id is the interest rate for the domestic currency.
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Table 2.3
GBP/JPY -30% -20% -10% -5% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Net revenue from 
FX gain/loss 
Holdco
(11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
Consolidated 
after-tax
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B Asymmetric Swap
Example 3
Non-resident bank and resident bank are unrelated. To eliminate exposure associated 
with a $150m long position on an equity index, non-resident bank enters into two 
swaps with resident bank. One swap (“the short swap”) is entered into with the 
offshore banking unit (OBU) of resident bank, which is subject to a 10 percent tax 
rate. The short swap requires: (i) non-resident bank to pay the percentage decrease 
in value of a $525m notional amount of the index; and (ii) resident bank to pay the 
percentage increase in value of the same notional principal. The other swap (“the long 
swap”) is entered into with resident bank’s domestic banking unit (DBU), which is 
subject to a 30 percent tax rate. The long swap requires: (i) non-resident bank to pay 
the percentage increase in value of a $675m notional amount of the index; and (ii) 
resident bank to pay the percentage decrease in value of the same notional principal. 
Figure 3
NR Bank DBU
short swap 525m
notional principal
long swap 675m
notional principal
OBU
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Similar to the foreign-currency hedges in examples 1 and 2, the asymmetric swap in 
example 3 is structured to provide asymmetric tax treatment of offsetting positions, 
but using different statutory tax rates rather than a timing mismatch. Gain or loss on 
the short swap is brought to account at a 10 percent tax rate by the OBU of resident 
bank, while offsetting loss or gain on the long swap is brought to account at a 30 
percent tax rate by resident bank’s DBU. To provide the required hedge of non-resident 
bank’s long equity index position of $150m, the notional principal amounts of the 
short and long swap positions are set to vary by this amount, but also incorporating a 
tax-rate scaling of the relevant amounts. Scaling of the positions ensures that after-tax 
gain on one position for resident bank is offset by after-tax loss on the other position. 
In short, the combination of the asymmetric tax treatment of the offsetting positions 
and the scaling up of the short swap position (472.50m/.9 = 525m) and long swap 
position (472.50m/.7 = 675m) allows resident bank to provide the required hedge to 
non-resident bank for a fee while transferring the net exposure to the equity index 
to government through the income tax system. Under various changes in the value 
of the equity index, this result is summarised in table 3.1 (after-tax positions of OBU 
and resident bank’s DBU, as well as government’s revenue position). The position of 
non-resident bank is summarised in table 3.2.
Table 3.1
Rise/fall 
value of 
equity 
index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Short swap: 
OBU
525 393.75 262.50 131.25 (131.25) (262.50) (393.75) (525)
Tax payable 52.50 39.38 26.25 13.13 (13.13) (26.25) (39.38) (52.50)
After-tax 472.50 354.37 236.25 118.12 (118.12) (236.25) (354.37) (472.50)
Long swap: 
DBU
(675) (506.25) (337.50) (168.75) 168.75 337.50 506.25 675
Tax payable (202.50) (151.88) (101.25) (50.63) 50.63 101.25 151.88 202.50
After-tax (472.50) (354.37) (236.25) (118.12) 118.12 236.25 354.37 472.50
Consolidated 
after-tax
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net revenue (150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
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Table 3.2
Rise/fall 
value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Long equity 
index
(150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
Long equity 
index swap
(525) (393.75) (262.50) (131.25) 131.25 262.50 393.75 525
Short equity 
index swap
675 506.25 337.50 168.75 (168.75) (337.50) (506.25) (675)
Net position 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
An alternative transaction to the asymmetric swap would involve non-resident bank 
entering into an offsetting short position with resident bank’s DBU. For example, non-
resident bank could enter into an equity index swap with a notional principal amount 
of $150m, whereby it would pay resident bank’s DBU any increase in the value of the 
index and it would receive any decrease in value. As summarised in table 3.3, this 
would leave non-resident bank with no net exposure to the index.
Table 3.3
Rise/fall value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Long equity index (150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
Short equity 
index swap
150 112.50 75 37.50  (37.50) (75) (112.50) (150)
Net position 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Resident bank’s DBU would assume a long position on the equity index of $150m 
and would otherwise have to hedge this position in the market for a fee charged to 
non-resident bank. If the long equity index position is left unhedged, government’s 
revenue position would reflect a sharing of the associated risk with resident bank’s 
DBU at the 30 percent tax rate applicable to it. This result is summarised in table 3.4. 
If the same position is hedged by the DBU, resident bank would realise no net gain or 
loss, and there would be no net revenue payable to government.
Table 3.4
Rise/fall value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Long equity index 
swap
(150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
Tax payable (45) (33.75) (22.50) (11.25) 11.25 22.50 33.75 45
After-tax position (105) (78.75) (52.50) (26.25) 26.25 52.50 78.75 105
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III Articulating the Policy Problem
In the absence of a behavioural response, returns to risk under an income tax are 
shared by taxpayers and government, with the relevant shares determined as a 
function of the relevant tax rates. Risk-transfer transactions, such as those in examples 
1 to 3, alter this tax treatment by transferring all of the return associated with a risky 
position to government through the income tax system. In the 2009 UK budget, 
this distinction between risk sharing and risk transfer was highlighted as the policy 
problem presented by such transactions:
“The Government is aware of certain structured arrangements (often described as 
Overhedging or underhedging) which, although not normally undertaken for tax 
avoidance, involve fragmenting transactions across group companies to ensure the 
Exchequer bears the full economic risk to the group. The Government believes that the 
economic risks should be shared between the Exchequer and business as Parliament 
intended.”17 
Although the tax literature on hedging ignores the academic literature on taxation 
and risk taking, a deeper and more complete understanding of the policy implications 
of this distinction between risk sharing and risk transfer in the context of hedge 
transactions can be found in this academic literature; it suggests that the policy 
relevance of the distinction depends on the nature of the response to risk taking 
under symmetric and asymmetric tax rates and, more particularly, the effect of this 
different rate environment on speculative positions as well as hedge transactions, 
both in terms of the decision to enter into such transactions and the form that such 
transactions take. Depending on some empirical assumptions about the dimension 
of certain behavioural responses, a review of this literature reveals that the policy 
problem highlighted in the 2009 UK budget extends beyond the limited set of risk-
transfer transactions that are the focus of the UK loss limitation and the application 
of Part IVA in TD 2010/12; it includes scaling of unhedged or speculative positions as 
well as any transaction by which pre-tax offsetting positions are scaled such that the 
pre-tax cash flows offset imperfectly while the after-tax cash flows offset perfectly or 
near perfectly.
A Risk Taking, Tax Rates and Scaling
The academic literature on taxation and risk taking focuses on the effect of the income 
tax on the decision to take on risk and originates with the seminal article by Evsey 
Domar and Richard Musgrave published nearly 70 years ago.18 Their fundamental 
insight concerns the behavioural response to risk taking under asymmetric gain and 
loss tax rates that result from limitations on the use of losses. Using a simple model, 
with portfolio choice limited to an asset without default risk yielding no real return 
17 HM Treasury, Budget 2009: Building Britain’s Future (London: The Stationery Office, 22 April 
2009), at para. 5.115.
18 Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave, “Proportional Income Taxation and Risk Taking” (1944) 
58 Quarterly Journal of Economics 388.
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and a risky asset in the sense that its payoff depends on a specified contingency, they 
illustrate that an income tax system with full loss offset has only an income effect 
and no substitution effect. In other words, symmetric treatment of gains and losses 
ensures that the after-tax gain/loss ratio is the same as the pre-tax ratio, and investors 
will determine the composition of their portfolios based on their taste for risk.
Example 4
Investor acquires a risky asset at a cost of $100 and that has a 50 percent chance of 
paying $120 or a 50 percent chance of paying $80. The expected return is zero ([0.5 
x $20] – [0.5 x ($20)]), which is consistent with the expected return on an alternative 
riskless asset available at a cost of $100 and paying $100 on maturity.
Assuming a 40 percent tax rate for illustrative purposes, the after-tax positive payoff 
on the risky asset in example 4 would be $12, and the negative payoff would be ($12) 
provided that losses are fully refunded for income tax purposes at the relevant rate. 
Symmetric gain/loss tax rates thus ensure that government shares at the same tax rate 
in both gains and losses on the risky asset. In contrast, asymmetric treatment of losses 
and gains alters the after-tax gain/loss ratio as compared to the pre-tax ratio. For 
example, if losses are not recognised for income tax purposes while gains are taxed at 
40 percent, the after-tax amount of the negative payoff on the risky asset in example 
4 is the same as its pre-tax amount of ($20); yet the after-tax amount of the positive 
payoff is $12. Under this particular asymmetric rate structure, government shares in 
gains at the 40 percent tax rate but does not share in losses, which may cause investors 
to substitute the riskless for the risky asset. These results, as well as those under a 40 
percent gain tax rate and a 20 percent loss tax rate, are summarised in table 4.
Table 4
40% 
gain/
loss tax 
rate
40% 
gain tax 
rate/NIL 
loss tax 
rate
40% 
gain tax 
rate/20% 
loss tax 
rate
Gain/loss 20 (20) 20 (20) 20 (20)
Tax payable 8 (8) 8 0 8 (4)
Net after-tax 12 (12) 12 (20) 12 (16)
One strain of the taxation and risk taking literature following Domar-Musgrave 
emphasises the dimensions of the substitution effect caused by asymmetric taxation 
of gains and losses.19 A subset of this strain of the literature refines the Domar-
19 The case for full loss refundability is based on Domar-Musgrave and the focus of their model 
on the substitution effect caused by asymmetric gain/loss tax rates attributable to binding loss 
limitations. This focus is apparent, for example, in Tax Review Panel, Australia’s Future Tax System: 
Report to the Treasurer (Canberra: Australian Treasury Department, December 2009), at 174-76.
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Musgrave model by introducing different specifications of investor taste for risk.20 
Another subset attempts to test empirically for the substitution effect under loss 
limitations which result in asymmetric taxation of gains and losses.21 A more recent 
strain of the taxation and risk taking literature emphasises, instead, the income effect 
under a proportional income tax with full loss offset.22 More particularly, as originally 
articulated by Kaplow,23 a tax environment characterised by symmetric gain/loss tax 
rates allows investors to eliminate the taxation of the return to risk bearing by scaling 
up risky asset positions to maintain the variance associated with desired pre-tax 
positions. In the presence of scaling, government continues to share in risky returns 
but additional risk is transferred through the income tax system.
Example 5
Investor acquires 1.66 units of risky asset at a cost of $166.67 and that have a 50 percent 
chance of paying $200 or a 50 percent chance of paying $133.33. The expected return 
is zero ([0.5 x $33.33] – [0.5 x ($33.33)]), which is consistent with the expected return 
on an alternative riskless asset available at a cost of $100 and paying $100 on maturity.
20 See, for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation 
on Risk Taking” (1969) 83 Quarterly Journal of Economics 263; and James Tobin, “Liquidity 
Preference as Behavior Towards Risk” (1958) 25 Review of Economic Studies 65.
21 See, for example, Julie Berry Cullen and Roger H. Gordon, “Taxes and Entrepreneurial Risk-
Taking: Theory and Evidence for the U.S.” (2007) 91 Journal of Public Economics 1479 (finding 
that various tax-law features, including loss limitations and progressive personal rates, have 
collectively had large effects on the amount of entrepreneurial activity, but observing that the 
option to incorporate can encourage risk taking by providing favourable asymmetric rates 
where the corporate rate is lower than the personal rate); and Michael G. Cooper and Matthew 
J. Knittel, “The Implications of Tax Asymmetry for U.S. Corporations” (2010) 63 National Tax 
Journal 33 (finding for the period 1993-2004 that partial loss refundability disproportionately 
affects certain industries and younger firms).
22 See Joseph Bankman and Barbara H. Fried, “Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption 
Tax” (1998) 86 Georgetown Law Journal 539; Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, “Is the 
Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax A Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?” 
(1992) 47 Tax Law Review 377; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., “How Much Capital Income Taxed Under 
an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?” (1996) 52 Tax Law Review 1; and David 
A. Weisbach, “The (Non) Taxation of Risk” (2004) 58 Tax Law Review 1. The model on which 
this literature is based is articulated in Louis Kaplow, “Taxation and Risk Taking: A General 
Equilibrium Perspective” (1994) 47 National Tax Journal 789. See also Jeremy I. Bulow and 
Lawrence H. Summers, “The Taxation of Risky Assets” (1984) 92 Journal of Political Economy 
20; and Roger H. Gordon, “Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues Versus Tax 
Distortions” (1985) 100 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1.
23 Kaplow, supra note 22. See also Thomas J. Brennan, “Certainty and Uncertainty in the Taxation 
of Risky Returns” (New York University School of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public 
Finance, April 2009) (observing that symmetric taxation of the return to risky assets provides a 
tax payoff profile equivalent to that of a forward contract written on the underlying asset in an 
amount equal to the tax that can be eliminated by entering into an equal and opposite forward 
contract).
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By scaling up the amount invested in the risky asset in example 4 to account for 
taxation of both gain and loss at a rate of 40 percent, the investor in example 5 ensures 
that after-tax returns equal the desired returns in the absence of tax. That is, the risk-
return trade off desired by the investor in the absence of tax is maintained in the 
presence of taxation. The scaled amount is a function of the formula: 
x (1/1-t) 
where 
x = the desired position in the absence of scaling
t = the tax rate applicable to the relevant position
With positive and negative pre-tax payoffs of $33.33 and ($33.33), respectively, the 
after-tax positive payoff subject to a 40 percent tax rate on the scaled-up investment 
in the risky asset would be $20, and the negative payoff would be ($20) where losses 
are fully refunded for income tax purposes at the same tax rate. As with example 4, 
symmetric gain/loss tax rates ensure that government shares at the same tax rate in 
both gains and losses on the risky asset. However, the investor in the risky asset in 
example 5 has increased government’s risky revenue position from $8/($8) to $13.33/
($13.33) by scaling up the amount invested, which provides an after-tax return equal 
to the desired pre-tax return of either $20 or ($20) in the absence of the tax. Scaling 
of the investment thus ensures that there is no substitution effect but only an income 
effect that eliminates taxation of the risky asset for the investor while increasing the 
magnitude of the risky revenue stream for government. 
Importantly, scaling has this result in an environment of symmetric gain/loss tax 
rates. Asymmetric gain and loss tax rates result in the risky asset being subject to tax 
despite the scaling up of the investment. Assuming, as with example 4, that losses 
are not recognised for income tax purposes while gains are taxed at 40 percent, the 
after-tax amount of the negative payoff on the risky asset in example 5 is the same as 
its pre-tax amount of ($33.33); yet the after-tax amount of the positive payoff is $20. 
The amount of the government share of gain is simply increased with the scaling of 
the investment. Where losses are not refunded, government does not share in the 
loss and captures an increased share of the gain. Where the loss tax rate is less than 
the gain tax rate, government also shares in the loss but at the lower rate. In effect, 
scaling in the presence of no loss offset means that the risky asset is subject to tax 
and government captures a positive revenue stream. Scaling in the presence of a 
positive loss tax rate that is less than the gain tax rate means that government realises 
a risky revenue stream, but the magnitude of this revenue stream is less than that in 
an environment of symmetric gain/loss tax rates. Risk is thereby transferred through 
the income tax system to government, but the transfer is incomplete because of an 
asymmetric sharing ratio that is a function of asymmetric gain/loss tax rates. These 
results are summarised in table 5.
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Table 5
40% 
gain/
loss tax 
rate
40% 
gain tax 
rate/NIL 
loss tax 
rate
40% 
gain tax 
rate/20% 
loss tax 
rate
Gain/loss 33.33 (33.33) 33.33 (33.33) 33.33 (33.33)
Tax payable 13.33 (13.33) 13.33 0 13.33 (6.67)
Net after-tax 20 (20) 20 (33.33) 20 (26.66)
B Hedge Transactions, Tax Rates and Scaling
Hedge transactions differ from those transactions that are the focus of the taxation 
and risk taking literature in the sense that the former are undertaken to eliminate 
risk associated with a long or short position, while the latter implicate the choice to 
take on risk by assuming an open or speculative long or short position in an asset 
with risky returns. But although it is unacknowledged, the conventional focus of the 
income tax treatment of hedge transactions is very much the same as that strain of 
the taxation and risk taking literature that emphasises the substitution effect under 
asymmetric gain/loss tax rates attributable to loss limitations. Indeed, hedge tax 
accounting regimes represent a particular application of the basic Domar-Musgrave 
insight.
Example 6
Investor is long a risky asset with a cost of $100 and that has a 50 percent chance of 
paying $120 or a 50 percent chance of paying $80. To eliminate the risk associated 
with the contingent payoffs on this asset, investor enters into an offsetting contract 
with a cost of $100 and that pays $80 if the payoff on the risky asset is $120 and $120 
if the payoff on the risky asset is $80.
In the presence of asymmetric gain/loss tax rates, offsetting pre-tax positions, 
consisting of a hedge and an underlying transaction, can result in a net tax position, 
either positive or negative. Assume, for example, that gain or loss on the risky asset in 
example 6 is subject to a 20 percent tax rate while offsetting loss or gain on the hedge 
contract is subject to a 40 percent tax rate. If the risky asset pays $120 and the hedge 
pays $80, investor will realise a $16 after-tax gain on the risky asset and a ($12) after-
tax loss on the hedge contract. The net after-tax result of the two offsetting positions 
for the hedged investor is a $4 tax saving even though the pre-tax gain of $20 on the 
risky asset is offset by a ($20) pre-tax loss on the hedge contract. If the risky asset pays 
$80 and the hedge pays $120, investor will realise a $12 after-tax gain on the hedge 
contract and a ($16) after-tax loss on the risky asset. The net after-tax result of the two 
offsetting positions for the hedged investor is a $4 tax payment even though the pre-
tax gain of $20 on the hedge contract is offset by a ($20) pre-tax loss on the risky asset. 
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The asymmetric gain and loss tax rates mean that government will either refund $4 
to investor or receive a $4 tax payment, even though the offsetting positions provide 
no net pre-tax gain or loss. These results are summarised in table 6.1, as well as those 
where: (i) the gain/loss tax rate on the underlying is 40 percent and the gain/loss tax 
rate on the hedge is 20 percent; and (ii) the gain tax rate is 40 percent and the loss tax 
rate is zero.
Table 6.1
20% gain/
loss tax 
rate on 
underlying 
and 40% 
gain/loss 
tax rate on 
hedge 
40% gain/
loss tax 
rate on 
underlying 
and 20% 
gain/loss 
tax rate on 
hedge
40% gain 
tax rate 
and zero 
loss tax 
rate
Gain/loss: 
underlying
20 (20) 20 (20) 20 (20)
Tax payable: 
underlying
4 (4) 8 (8) 8 0
After-tax: 
underlying
16 (16) 12 (12) 12 (20)
Gain/loss: hedge (20) 20 (20) 20 (20) 20
Tax payable: 
hedge
(8) 8 (4) 4 0 8
After-tax: hedge (12) 12 (16) 16 (20) 12
Net tax payable: 
underlying and 
hedge
(4) 4 4 (4) 8 8
Net after-tax: 
underlying and 
hedge
4 (4) (4) 4 (8) (8)
Net pre-tax: 
underlying and 
hedge
0 0 0 0 0 0
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In addition to loss limitations, which can result in an effective zero loss tax rate, 
reduced recognition rates for capital gains and losses,24 as well as different timing rules 
for transactions on capital and non-capital account,25 can mean that the components 
of a hedged position (that is, the underlying position and the hedge) are subject to 
asymmetric taxation, with the after-tax result different from the pre-tax result. As 
with the strain of the taxation and risk-taking literature emphasising the substitution 
effect under loss limitations, much of the tax policy literature has emphasised the 
substitution effect for the choice to transfer risk under asymmetric taxation of an 
underlying transaction and a hedge. That is, taxing offsetting pre-tax payoffs as if they 
give rise to net gain or loss may cause taxpayers to forgo all or a portion of a hedged 
position with associated efficiency losses. 
Hedge tax accounting regimes are intended to restore symmetric taxation of gain 
and loss on a hedged asset or liability and an offsetting hedge, usually by altering the 
treatment of the timing and character of the gain or loss on the latter consistent with 
the loss or gain on the former. In short, applying timing and character recognition 
for gain or loss on a hedge with reference to loss or gain on an underlying position 
ensures matching offsetting positions. By maintaining symmetry of tax treatment in 
these particular respects, adverse pricing effects that might otherwise inhibit efficient 
hedging strategies are avoided.26 It is probably accurate to say that, in principle at 
least, this form of integrated treatment, which is the basis for hedge tax accounting 
regimes, is regarded favourably in the tax literature.27 The results of the application of 
a hedge tax accounting regime providing symmetric taxation of the underlying and 
hedge in example 6 are summarised in table 6.2.
24 See, for example, the discount capital gains rules in ITAA 1997, Division 115.
25 See, in this respect, examples 1 and 2. The results of a risk-transfer transaction focused on 
asymmetry of timing do not account for asymmetry of tax rates attributable to asymmetry of 
character. 
26 See, for example, David M. Schizer, “Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda 
for Reform” (2004) 104 Columbia Law Review 1886, at 1914-15 (arguing that a hedge accounting 
regime is defensible because of the maintenance of symmetry of gain and loss recognition rates 
for offsetting positions).
27 The conventional view in the finance literature holds that hedging can increase the value of a 
firm by, in part, reducing taxes through the smoothing of taxable income. See, for example, Jean-
Marie Gagnon, Nabil Khoury, and Suzanne Landry, “The Tax Benefits of Hedging for Small and 
Medium-Sized Firms” (2010) 23 Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship 393; and John R. 
Graham and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., “Tax Incentives to Hedge” (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 2241 
(exploring the extent to which firms facing convex tax functions hedge to reduce the volatility 
of taxable income). But see also John R. Graham and Daniel A. Rogers, “Do Firms Hedge in 
Response to Tax Incentives?” (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 815 (finding that firms hedge to 
increase debt capacity and its associated tax benefit).
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Table 6.2
20% gain/loss tax 
rate underlying 
and hedge 
contract
Gain/loss: underlying 20 (20)
Tax payable: underlying 8 (8)
After-tax: underlying 12 (12)
Gain/loss: hedge (20) 20
Tax payable: hedge (8) 8
After-tax: hedge (12) 12
Net tax payable: underlying and hedge 0 0
Net after-tax: underlying and hedge 0 0
Net pre-tax: underlying and hedge 0 0
Risk-transfer transactions are based on the same fundamental insight as the strain 
of the taxation and risk taking literature emphasising the income effect and the 
elimination of the taxation of risky returns through scaling of a risky position. These 
transactions differ importantly, however, from the decision to take on risk and the 
elimination of the taxation of risky returns through scaling, which requires full loss 
offset and fixed symmetric gain/loss tax rates. As a form of hedge transaction, risk-
transfer transactions also require non-binding loss limitations (that is, losses on 
a position can be used in full to offset income taxable at the same rate as the gain 
tax rate on the position); but such transactions require fixed asymmetric gain/loss 
tax rates applicable to an underlying position and a related hedge. This, in turn, 
requires the inapplicability of a hedge tax accounting regime, or where applicable, its 
limited effect in the form of symmetric timing and character treatment. Under these 
necessary conditions, an underlying transaction and a hedge can be scaled such that 
pre-tax cash flows do not offset, but after-tax cash flows do offset and risky returns on 
the underlying are eliminated on an after-tax basis. The scaled positions required to 
realise an effective after-tax hedge can be generalised as a function of fixed asymmetric 
tax rates applicable to an underlying position and a hedge position:28
28 Feder, supra note 7, at 1615.
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r = 1-tu/1-th
where
r = the hedge ratio
tu = the tax rate on the underlying position
th = the tax rate on the hedge position
Example 7
Investor is long a risky asset with a cost of $100 and that has a 50 percent chance 
of paying $120 or a 50 percent chance of paying $80. Returns on the risky asset are 
subject to a 20 percent tax rate. To eliminate the risk associated with the contingent 
payoffs on this asset on an after-tax basis, investor enters into an offsetting contract 
with a cost of $133.33 and that pays $106.67 if the payoff on the risky asset is $120 and 
$160 if the payoff on the risky asset is $80. Risky returns on the offsetting contract are 
subject to a 40 percent tax rate.
Unlike the investor in example 6, the investor in example 7 has scaled up the hedge 
to $133.33 in the absence of a hedge tax accounting regime to provide an after-tax 
gain or loss that offsets after-tax loss or gain on the asymmetrically taxed underlying 
position with a cost of $100. The after-tax result is thus consistent with that which 
would arise when the pre-tax cash flows on the hedge and underlying positions offset 
and are taxed symmetrically. If the risky asset pays $120, the hedge will pay $106.67, 
and investor will realise a $16 after-tax gain on the risky asset and a ($16) after-tax 
loss on the hedge contract. If the risky asset instead pays $80 and the hedge pays $160, 
investor will realise a ($16) after-tax loss on the underlying position and a $16 after-tax 
gain on the hedge contract. This scaling of the hedge does not eliminate, however, the 
effect of asymmetric tax rates for government, which provides an increased amount 
of loss relief or receives an increased tax payment that is a function of the scaled 
position. For example, in example 6, the asymmetric gain and loss tax rates mean 
that government will either refund $4 to investor or receive a $4 tax payment even 
though the offsetting positions provide no net pre-tax gain or loss. These two results 
are increased to either a $6.67 refund or a $6.67 tax payment as a result of the scaled 
up hedge. In effect, the risky revenue stream is increased in magnitude by the scaled 
position, and risk is transferred to government in the same manner emphasised by 
the strain of the taxation and risk taking literature emphasising the income effect 
associated with scaling of speculative risky positions. Table 7 summarises the results 
of scaling the underlying and hedge in example 7 under different gain/loss tax rate 
assumptions and different hedge ratios.
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Table 7
20% gain/
loss tax rate 
on underlying 
and 40% 
gain/loss 
tax rate on 
hedge
40% gain/
loss tax rate 
on underlying 
and 20% 
gain/loss tax 
rate on hedge
zero tax 
rate on 
underlying 
and 40% 
tax rate on 
hedge
Hedge ratio 1.33 0.75 1.67
Gain/loss: 
underlying
20 (20) 20 (20) 20 (20)
Tax payable: 
underlying
4 (4) 8 (8) 0 0
After-tax: 
underlying
16 (16) 12 (12) 20 (20)
Gain/loss: 
hedge
(26.67) 26.67 (15) 15 (33.33) 33.33
Tax payable: 
hedge
(10.67) 10.67 (3) 3 (13.33) 13.33
After-tax: 
hedge
(16) 16 (12) 12 20 20
Net tax 
payable: 
underlying 
and hedge
(6.67) 6.67 5 (5) (13.33) 13.33
Net after-tax: 
underlying and 
hedge
0 0 0 0 0 0
Net pre-tax: 
underlying 
and hedge
(6.67) 6.67 5 (5) (13.33) 13.33
Example 8
Investor is long a risky asset with a cost of $125 and that has a 50 percent chance of 
paying $150 or a 50 percent chance of paying $100. Returns on the risky asset are 
subject to a 20 percent tax rate. To eliminate the risk associated with the contingent 
payoffs on this asset on an after-tax basis, investor enters into an offsetting contract 
with a cost of $166.67 and that pays $133.33 if the payoff on the risky asset is $150 and 
$200 if the payoff on the risky asset is $100. Risky returns on the offsetting contract 
are subject to a 40 percent tax rate.
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Example 8 illustrates how it is also possible to scale both the underlying and hedge 
positions to provide offsetting after-tax cash flows that are equal to the desired 
offsetting pre-tax cash flows. Here again, each position must be scaled up as a function 
of the tax rate applicable to the position, with the required scaling expressed generally 
by the formula x(1/1-t) noted above. At an assumed 20 percent tax rate applicable 
to the underlying, investor has scaled up this position from $100 to $125 and, at a 
40 percent tax rate applicable to the hedge, has scaled up this position from $100 to 
$166.67. If the risky asset pays $150, the hedge will pay $133.33, and investor will 
realise a $20 after-tax gain on the risky asset and a ($20) after-tax loss on the hedge. 
If the risky asset pays $100 and the hedge pays $200, investor will realise a ($20) 
after-tax loss on the underlying and a $20 after-tax gain on the hedge. As compared 
to examples 6 and 7, the magnitude of the government’s risky revenue position has 
been increased such that it will either refund $8.33 to investor or receive a $8.33 tax 
payment (rather than a $4 refund or $4 tax payment in example 6 and a $6.67 refund 
or $6.67 payment in example 7). These results are summarised in table 8.
Table 8
20% gain/loss tax rate on underlying and 
40% gain/loss tax rate on hedge contract
Gain/loss: underlying 25 (25)
Tax payable: underlying 5 (5)
After-tax: underlying 20 (20)
Gain/loss: hedge (33.33) 33.33
Tax payable: hedge (13.33) 13.33
After-tax: hedge (20) 20
Net tax payable: 
underlying and hedge
(8.33) 8.33
Net after-tax: underlying 
and hedge
0 0
Net pre-tax: underlying 
and hedge
(8.33) 8.33
Example 9 
Bankco assumes a long position with investor on a risky asset at a notional principal 
amount of $300. At the same time, Bankco assumes a short position with investor on 
the same risky asset at a notional principal amount of $400. Bankco’s long position is 
subject to a 20 percent tax rate. The short position is subject to a 40 percent tax rate.
342 (2013) 28 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM
As illustrated by example 9, the ability to scale offsetting positions to provide offsetting 
after-tax cash flows equal to the desired pre-tax cash flows means that offsetting 
positions can be adjusted such that government’s risky revenue stream replicates the 
risk associated with an open or unhedged market position. This result is summarised 
in table 9 where it can be seen that, whatever the change in value of the long and short 
positions, the net tax payable of Bankco replicates the cash flows associated with an 
open or unhedged short position in respect of the risky asset with a notional principal 
value of $100. 
Table 9
Rise/fall value 
of risky asset
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Long position: 
Bankco
(300) (225) (150) (75) 75 150 225 300
Tax payable (60) (45) (30) (15) 15 30 45 60
After-tax: long 
position
(240) (180) (120) (60) 60 120 180 240
Short position: 
Bankco
400 300 200 100 (100) (200) (300) (400)
Tax payable 160 120 80 40 (40) (80) (120) (160)
After-tax: short 
position
240 180 120 60 (60) (120) (180) (240)
Net tax payable: 
Bankco
100 75 50 25 (25) (50) (75) (100)
Net after-tax 
position: Bankco
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Short position: 
investor
300 225 150 75 (75) (150) (225) (300)
Long position: 
investor
(400) (300) (200) (100) 100 200 300 400
Net position: 
investor
(100) (75) (50) (25) 25 50 75 100
With appropriate scaling of offsetting long and short positions, Bankco can serve as 
the counterparty for an investor on the other side of each position who, on a net basis, 
takes these positions to hedge risk associated with an otherwise open position with 
respect to a risky asset. Bankco, however, is able to transfer the market risk associated 
with its net position to government through the income tax system. The required 
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scaling of the positions to realise this result can be generalised as a function of the 
formula:29 
long - short OR short - long = net exposure 
where 
short = long x (1-tlong) / (1 - tshort) OR
long = short x (1-tshort)/(1-tlong)
t = tax rate for long or for short
C Policy Implications of Scaling
To summarise the descriptive propositions illustrated by examples 4 to 9, scaling 
of risky positions permits risk sharing between taxpayers and government to be 
magnified. Under symmetric tax rates, scaling can ensure that the risk associated with 
pre-tax cash flows is maintained while transferring an additional risky revenue stream 
to government in the process. Under asymmetric tax rates, government also assumes 
a risky revenue stream which is similarly magnified by scaling to provide either: 
• offsetting after-tax cash flows; 
• offsetting after-tax cash flows equal to the desired pre-tax cash flows in 
the absence of scaling; or
• offsetting after-tax cash flows with imperfectly offsetting pre-tax cash 
flows equal to an unhedged position. 
As the basis of an apparent policy problem, a focus on a distinction between risk 
sharing and risk transfer appears to assume an environment of symmetric tax 
rates and the absence of scaling as a benchmark in much the same manner as that 
emphasised by Domar-Musgrave. Scaling alters government’s risky revenue stream 
by magnifying positions in risky assets and, in this sense, there is a risk transfer, albeit 
there is still risk sharing determined as a function of tax rates. With both symmetric 
and asymmetric tax rates, scaling of positions does not alter the gain/loss ratio that 
determines the sharing proportion, but the magnitude of the positions is altered, 
with government effectively serving a risk-bearing function through the income tax 
system. Moreover, the additional risky revenue stream created by scaling the positions 
of one taxpayer is not necessarily offset by an opposite risky revenue stream of a 
market counterparty, who may hedge the scaled position and/or may be subject to 
different effective tax rates, including taxation in another jurisdiction; nor is it clear 
that the market risk transferred to government through scaling is uncorrelated, which 
would reduce its exposure. In the absence of a willingness or an ability to assess and 
29 TD 2010/12, supra note 1, at para. 8.
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transfer the additional risky revenue stream back into the market, government serves 
as an involuntary counterparty with an open market position.30 
This ability to scale risky positions has focused the associated policy debate in the 
academic literature on the extent to which returns to risk are actually taxed under 
a personal income tax. To the extent that scaling of such positions is unconstrained, 
taxpayers can eliminate the taxation of returns to risk. The non-taxation of risk 
means that an income tax is comparable to a consumption tax in this respect, with 
the principal difference being the treatment of time-value returns which are taxed 
under an income tax but not a consumption tax.31 Consumption tax proponents 
argue that such returns are historically modest and that a consumption tax can be 
preferred over an income tax for administrative and compliance cost reasons. Income 
tax proponents argue that the minimal differences between the two choices of tax base 
mean that the efficiency gains attributable to a consumption tax have been overstated, 
and an income tax can be preferred given difficult transitional issues in moving to a 
consumption tax. 
More realistically, however, it is recognised in the academic literature that two common 
features of personal income tax systems constrain the ability to scale the magnitude 
of the bet element associated with risky assets. One such feature is limitations on the 
recognition of losses. When such limitations are binding, they eliminate the effective 
loss refundability that is required for scaling to be effective. The other feature is 
progressive personal tax rates. In this rate environment, scaling a risky position means 
that gains may be subject to a higher tax rate which alters the required scaling ratio ex 
post.32 Given these tax constraints on scaling, governments are able to tax returns to 
30 See Alan J. Auerbach, “Notes on Taxation and Risk Taking” (2009) 24 Australian Tax Forum 
31, at 34-38 (reviewing the assumptions on which Kaplow’s model is based, including the 
assumption that government can and will sell undiversifiable risk back into the market); Alan 
J. Auerbach, “How Much Equity Does the Government Hold?” (2004) 94 American Economic 
Review 155 (estimating the sensitivity of the US government’s present-value revenue stream to 
movements in the stock market as equivalent to an implicit equity position of 1.8 times the 
entire stock market); and Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Brooks, “Revenue Risk and Revenue 
Timing: A View from Rational Choice Politics” (2009) 24 Australian Tax Forum 89 (arguing that 
the political discount rate for the risky revenue stream may not equal the market discount rate). 
See also James Hollis, “Section 46 of and Schedule 16 to the Finance Act 2010: Risk Transfer 
Schemes” [2010] no. 5 British Tax Review 444, at 446 (“HMRC are apparently concerned not 
just that the pricing of the risk the Exchequer was being asked to assume is inappropriate, but 
that it is not in a position for it to be running such risks at all, since, unlike a commercial hedge 
provider, it is not in a position to assess the risk.”). 
31 Neil Brooks, “An Overview of the Role of the VAT, Fundamental Tax Reform, and a Defence 
of the Income Tax,” in David White and Richard Krever eds., GST in Retrospect and Prospect 
(Auckland: Thomson, Brookers Publishing, 2007) 597, at 646-48.
32 See Daniel Shaviro, The 2008-09 Financial Crisis: Implications for Income Tax Reform (NYU Law 
and Economics Research Paper No. 09-35, 15 August 2009), at 13 (suggesting that a progressive 
tax rate structure is the principal source of asymmetric taxation for individual entrepreneurs, 
while loss limitations are the principal source for large publicly-traded corporations). The extent 
that loss limitations are binding, and thereby result in asymmetric taxation of gains and losses, 
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risk.33 In fact, loss limitations and progressive personal income tax rates have much 
the same effect as transaction costs and other non-tax factors, such as constraints 
on the ability to borrow at rates below expected returns on risky assets, which also 
constrain scaling.34 Moreover, loss limitations and progressive personal income tax 
rates have independent normative significance and have generally been seen by tax 
policymakers to trump possible efficiency losses associated with any behavioural 
response to asymmetric tax rates for gains and losses. The singular exception in this 
respect is a hedge tax accounting regime.
Given the tax and non-tax constraints in the context of the personal income tax, it is 
perhaps not surprising that there is no systematic empirical evidence of tax-driven 
scaling of speculative positions in this particular context. 35 It is, however, somewhat 
surprising that, in the context of the corporate income tax, the academic literature, 
both theoretical and empirical, has universally ignored the possibility of scaling 
of risky asset positions and any associated policy significance.36 The inattention is 
curious since one of the principal tax constraints on scaling – progressive tax rates 
– is either a non-existent feature of corporate income tax systems or, at least, not as 
pervasive. As a result, scaling is largely unconstrained by tax factors provided that 
limitations on the recognition of losses are not binding. With fixed gain/loss tax 
rates that are symmetric, the focus of scaling is the elimination of the taxation of 
risky returns associated with speculative positions. With fixed gain/loss tax rates that 
may differ under the personal income tax and the corporate income tax. See, for example, Alan 
J. Auerbach, Leonard E. Burman, and Jonathan M. Siegel, “Capital Gains Taxation and Tax 
Avoidance: New Evidence from Panel Data,” in Joel Slemrod ed., Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic 
Consequences of Taxing the Rich 355, at 377-78 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Harvard 
University Press, 2000) (finding that most individuals in the United States were able to deduct 
capital losses within one or two years of realisation given the ability to deduct up to $3,000 of 
such losses annually against ordinary income).
33 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, “Risk, Rents, and Regressivity: Why the United States Needs Both an 
Income Tax and a VAT” (2004) 105 Tax Notes 1651.
34 See Brooks, supra note 31, at 609-17. See also David Elkins and Christopher H. Hanna, “Taxation 
of Supernormal Returns” (2008) 62 The Tax Lawyer 93 (scaling is unavailable with assets yielding 
supernormal returns to human capital and should be taxed under a consumption tax); Deborah 
H. Schenk, “Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax” (2000) 53 Tax Law Review 423 (arguing 
that the imputation of interest at the riskless rate on all capital assets is normatively desirable as 
a tax base, since the return to risk is taxed only accidentally under an income tax when non-tax 
factors constrain the ability to alter portfolios in response to the tax); and Lawrence Zelenak, 
“The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax” 
(2006) 59 SMU Law Review 879 (emphasising the erratic taxation of risk under progressive 
tax rates). But see Brennan, supra note 23 (demonstrating that asymmetric treatment of risky 
returns produces tax burdens that are both systematic and quantifiable).
35 See Weisbach, supra note 22, at 45-47 (surveying the empirical literature on taxation and 
portfolio choice and characterising it as inconclusive).
36 See Feder, supra note 7, at 1613 (noting that conventional wisdom holds that the limited 
application of hedge tax accounting regimes to a single entity in which both an underlying 
risk and a hedge of it are located can lead to tax fragmentation where the hedging function is 
centralised in a single entity and risk is incurred in other entities of the same corporate group).
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are asymmetric, the focus of scaling shifts from the elimination of the taxation of 
risky returns associated with speculative positions to the elimination of risk through 
hedging. 
At one extreme, unconstrained scaling in this tax environment means that government 
can be made the involuntary hedge counterparty for all market risk which is effectively 
transferred to it by the corporate sector through the income tax system. At the other 
extreme, if scaling is entirely constrained by non-tax factors and/or binding loss 
limitations, speculative positions, as well as hedge transactions that provide offsetting 
pre-tax cash flows, generate a revenue stream which is positive where loss limitations 
are binding (that is, an effective zero loss tax rate) and is risky where tax rates are 
either symmetric and fixed or asymmetric and fixed with effective loss refundability 
because of non-binding loss limitations. The empirical reality is probably somewhere 
in between these two extremes. That is, there is a range of corporate taxpayers who 
do not face binding loss limitations and can transfer risk to government through the 
income tax system by scaling speculative positions or by scaling offsetting positions 
taxed at asymmetric rates; there is also a range of corporate taxpayers who cannot 
effect the same risk transfer through scaling either because they are subject to binding 
loss limitations37 or are otherwise constrained by non-tax factors. 
In the absence of a market failure that would suggest government should play a role in 
assuming the relevant risk,38 there is no normative basis to support such risk transfers 
through scaling. In short, it is not obvious that government needs to serve a risk 
bearing role where diversification is otherwise available and derivative markets are 
complete in the sense that risk associated with an asset or liability can be hedged. 
Furthermore, the incidence of risk transfer through scaling is the random outcome 
of the presence of binding non-tax constraints on such behaviour39 as well as the tax 
37 See, for example, Alan J. Auerbach, “Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another 
Look” (2007) 53 CESIFO Economic Studies 153 (finding that non-deductible current losses net of 
net operating losses in the corporate sector increased from 11 percent of income in 1996-97 to 
44 percent in 2001-03); Rosanne Altshuler and Alan J. Auerbach, “The Significance of Tax Law 
Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation” (1990) 105 Quarterly Journal of Economics 61 (finding 
for the period 1971-82 that one-half of firms in the non-financial sector, weighted by book assets, 
were required to carry forward tax benefits); and Michael Cooper and Matthew Knittel, “Partial 
Loss Refundability: How Are Corporate Tax Losses Used?” (2006) 59 National Tax Journal 651 
(finding for a dataset of firms for the period 1993-2003 that: (i) 50-60 percent of tax losses are 
used over a ten-year carryover period; and (ii) 25-30 percent of tax losses expire unused).
38 See David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). To the extent that risk transferred through scaling is 
uncorrelated, government can be seen to provide a form of tolerable subsidised insurance to self-
selecting taxpayers. This role may be served more effectively by larger governments with larger 
tax bases and offsetting positions. But see the sources cited supra note 30.
39 See Feder, supra note 7, at 1615 (describing some non-tax constraints on scaling, which include: 
(i) the focus of some publicly-traded entities on pre-tax cash flows rather than after-tax cash 
flows for financial statement purposes; and (ii) regulatory requirements faced by banks, 
insurance companies and securities dealers).
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constraint imposed by binding loss limitations on some corporate taxpayers.40 In this 
respect, one of us has argued elsewhere for the adoption of a binding loss limitation 
applicable to the speculative positions of traders in deep and liquid markets for 
financial instruments that permit diversification of risk at low transaction costs.41 As 
with scaling of open positions, risk-transfer transactions in the context of imperfectly 
offsetting pre-tax positions that are scaled in the presence of asymmetric tax rates 
would be acceptable from a public policy perspective only if its apparently random 
incidence disguised a proxy that suitably identified those corporate taxpayers who, 
in fact, face undiversifiable risk that government could justifiably bear as a means to 
correct an associated market failure. Yet this proposition seems unlikely, in which case 
tax policymakers should also consider some form of loss limitation that eliminates 
the transfer of risk through the income tax system in this different context. But tax 
policymakers are left to respond, if at all, in a state of empirical ignorance with, at best, 
fragmentary transactional evidence of scaling as a hedge strategy.
Because a risk-transfer transaction in the context of hedged positions is commonly 
structured to avoid application of a hedge tax accounting regime providing symmetric 
timing and character recognition, the presence of such a regime may seem relevant 
to the case for adoption of a loss limitation.42 In effect, it might be thought that the 
case for a loss limitation is more compelling where tax policymakers have provided 
symmetric gain/loss tax rates to remove any tax barriers to hedge transactions, 
but a range of corporate taxpayers construct their hedge transactions to avoid this 
treatment and instead transfer risk to government through the income tax system 
by scaling what would otherwise be offsetting pre-tax cash flows. As an initial 
proposition, however, the presence or absence of a hedge tax accounting regime 
providing symmetric tax treatment of offsetting pre-tax cash flows should not be seen 
40 See, in this respect, Technical Note, supra note 10, at 5 (“… since these transactions would not 
be commercially viable for the business if the risks could not be passed on to the Exchequer, 
they allow groups to enter into arrangements that are intrinsically non-commercial, distort 
activity and provide groups that are prepared to undertake these transactions with an unfair 
advantage.”). The need for a tax base large enough to support the tax volatility associated with 
risk-transfer transactions may limit such transactions, for all practical purposes, to a small 
number of large publicly-traded corporations. But see, Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-
Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 7 and 41 (noting that risk-transfer transactions “… originated in 
the banking sector, but there is evidence that they are also used in other industries and, in some 
instances, also by medium-sized enterprises, thus generating an even bigger threat to revenue.”).
41 Tim Edgar, “Financial Instability, Tax Policy and the Tax Expenditure Concept” (2010) vol. 63 
SMU Law Review 969, at 1023-25 But see, in this respect, Technical Note, supra note 10, at 1 
(noting that the loss limitation proposals applicable to risk-transfer schemes do not seek to disturb 
in any way the treatment of trading gains and losses on unhedged speculative positions taken by 
financial traders and others in financial instruments that are not part of such arrangements).
42 See, for example, Technical Note, supra note 10, at 1 (noting the UK government’s concerns 
with those overhedging and underhedging arrangements which sidestep or exploit the hedge 
tax accounting regime to obtain levels of financing costs commensurate with exposure to certain 
economic risks while effectively passing those risks to the Exchequer).
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as somehow determinative of the need for a loss limitation applicable to risk-transfer 
transactions. 
Where a hedge tax accounting regime does not exist, tax policymakers have 
presumably decided that any effect of asymmetric treatment of offsetting positions 
on the level of hedging undertaken by taxpayers is not significant enough to warrant 
the associated administrative and compliance issues. It is not clear that this decision 
implies an acceptance of the risk transfer effect associated with scaling of pre-tax 
positions to provide offsetting after-tax cash flows. Where a hedge tax accounting 
regime does exist, administrative and compliance considerations may dictate 
incomplete application. In particular, such regimes tend to be limited in their 
application to domestic taxpayers and transactions. In addition they tend to focus on 
symmetric timing and character treatment of offsetting positions and do not extend 
to the asymmetric treatment attributable to different statutory tax rates of corporate 
group members subject to different tax jurisdictions. Taxpayers may take advantage of 
incompleteness to structure hedge strategies to avoid the application of the symmetric 
treatment associated with a hedge tax accounting regime and to attract the application 
of asymmetric gain/loss tax rates and the risk transfer through the income tax system 
that is the result of scaling otherwise offsetting pre-tax cash flows. 
In either legislative environment (that is, with or without a hedge tax accounting 
regime), there may be a range of corporate taxpayers who will scale offsetting 
positions to provide an effective after-tax hedge with a consequent transfer of risk 
through the income tax system. Arguably, the motivation for doing so is entirely 
irrelevant. Although the range of corporate taxpayers who scale offsetting positions 
may be greater where a hedge tax accounting regime has not been adopted, this 
difference is one of degree and not one of kind in the sense that the problematic policy 
attributes described above are somehow different. As an initial proposition, therefore, 
a loss limitation may be adopted irrespective of the presence or absence of a hedge 
tax accounting regime. We describe in the next part below what that response might 
be and what other factors may suggest that the response be narrowed in its targeting, 
leaving a range of risk-transfer transactions unaffected. 
IV Designing a Loss Limitation
The lack of any normatively compelling rationale for the transfer of risk to government 
through the income tax system by some corporate taxpayers, but not others, means 
that tax policymakers should respond by eliminating the benefit of scaling of offsetting 
risky positions subject to asymmetric gain/loss tax rates. Ideally, this result would be 
realised through a loss limitation applicable to such transactions generally: that is, a loss 
limitation rule that extends to any hedging strategy providing imperfectly offsetting 
pre-tax cash flows but perfectly or near perfectly offsetting after-tax cash flows.
This kind of targeted legislative response is required where, as described above in 
part three, it is decided that the consequential attributes of risk-transfer transactions 
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that do not provide a tax benefit are sufficiently problematic. In this respect, it is 
notable that judicial responses to tax-driven straddle transactions have been, at best, 
incomplete. In contrast with a broad range of risk-transfer transactions that do not 
provide a tax benefit, these transactions involve perfectly or near-perfectly offsetting 
pre-tax cash flows, with the taxpayer manipulating realisation-based recognition 
to accelerate recognition of loss while deferring offsetting gain.43 In the absence of 
a targeted loss limitation like the US straddle rules,44 tax administrators are left to 
challenge these tax-driven transactions under general anti-tax-avoidance rules45 and/
or doctrines.46 Creative characterisations of the transactions as a single property have 
met with only limited success in litigation.47 
43 The tax effectiveness of a straddle depends on a strict adherence to the realisation requirement 
as the appropriate timing rule for the recognition of unexpected gain or loss, as well as an 
acceptance of the legal form of the offsetting legs as separate financial instruments. This kind 
of reliance on legal form is apparent in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in The 
Queen v. Friedberg, 93 DTC 5507; [1993] 2 CTC 306 which expressly confirmed that the daily 
crediting or debiting of the margin accounts of taxpayers engaged in futures trading is a security 
arrangement only and does not constitute a realisation event. Absent a specific legislative 
provision requiring the netting of realised losses against unrealised gains, the court concluded 
that long and short positions in futures contracts should be regarded as separate financial 
instruments that are accounted for separately on a realisation basis.
44 IRC, section 1092. US policymakers reacted early and swiftly with this specific legislation 
intended to address the marketing of commodity straddles by the tax shelter industry in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 
General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, (Washington: Joint Committee 
Print, 1981), at 282-83. The legislation is nothing more than a loss limitation rule based on 
the integration of offsetting positions that comprise a straddle. The basic limitation applies to 
“offsetting positions with respect to personal property.”
45 The ATO has stated that it will normally deny the recognition of losses on straddle transactions 
on the basis that it is necessary to have regard to the overall result of the entire set of transactions 
implemented for avoidance purposes. See Income Tax Rulings IT 2228; Roger Paul, “Financial 
Risk Management and the Taxation of Financial Products,” in Taxation of Corporate Debt 
Finance, Rick Krever, Yuri Grbich and Patrick Gallagher eds., (Melbourne: Longman Professional 
Publishing, 1991), 209, at 237-38; and David C. Temby, “Swaps, Options, Forwards and Futures,” 
in Australian International Taxation: Recent Developments and Future Directions, Richard Krever 
and Yuri Grbich, eds, (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1994), 119, at 151-52.
46 Before the enactment of specific legislation, some US courts held that recognition of realised 
losses on the losing leg of a straddle were denied either because the transactions were shams 
in the sense that they were never implemented or, if valid transactions, the taxpayers could 
not show that they were entered into with a profit motive. See Frank V. Battle, Jr., “Corporate 
Tax Shelters, Financial Engineering and the Colgate Case” (1997) 75 Taxes 692, at 694-95; and 
Bradford L. Ferguson, “The Rationales for the Rules: How to Think About Derivatives in the Tax 
World” (1994) 72 Taxes 995, at 1023, footnote 140.
47 See, for example, Schultz v. The Queen, 95 DTC 5657; [1996] 2 CTC 127 (FCA) (straddle 
transactions of husband and wife characterised as a partnership and, therefore, requiring 
proportionate recognition of gain and loss by partners); and Hayes et al. v. The Queen, 2003 DTC 
1205 (TCC) (characterising offsetting long and short positions as a single property with gain 
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We describe in the next part of the article how general anti-tax-avoidance rules 
and/or doctrines can be similarly used to address the limited range of risk-transfer 
transactions that are entered into to provide a tax benefit. For the broader range of 
transactions that cannot be so characterised, the transfer of market risk through 
the income tax system can be completely addressed only through a legislative loss 
limitation.48 Experience with tax-driven straddle transactions would suggest that 
judicially-creative characterisations of the transactions under general income tax 
rules and/or principles cannot possibly provide a complete and consistent response.
As emphasised already, the increased magnitude of the risky revenue stream that is 
the result of scaling does not dictate, in principle at least, a limited focus on the kinds 
of structured risk-transfer transactions in examples 1 to 3 that are the target of limited 
responses by UK Inland Revenue and the ATO. The broader dimension of the policy 
problem suggests a much broader policy response in the form of a loss limitation 
applicable to risk-transfer transactions generally. Costliness associated with the 
identification exercise may be seen, however, to require a more limited response to a 
subset of risk-transfer transactions, particularly where tax policymakers perceive that 
the problematic policy consequences of the broader set of these transactions are less 
severe than the behavioural response that might result from the incompleteness of a 
hedge tax accounting regime or the lack of such a regime. In effect, tax policymakers 
may be willing to tolerate a range of risk-transfer transactions on the basis of an 
empirical assumption that non-tax factors, the necessary tax conditions and, in some 
instances, the presence of a hedge tax accounting regime serve to suitably constrain 
implementation of such transactions to an extent that they present a tolerable risky 
revenue exposure. The presence of a hedge tax accounting regime can be seen, 
therefore, to support a more narrowly-targeted loss limitation.
A Form of Loss Denial 
Because the tax effectiveness of scaling depends on the ability to offset losses against 
income subject to the same tax rate, a non-recognition rule for the scaled portion of 
pre-tax losses would eliminate that effectiveness. In other words, this kind of non-
recognition rule would negate the risk transfer otherwise attributable to scaling 
by disturbing the after-tax equivalence of imperfectly offsetting pre-tax cash flows 
subject to asymmetric tax rates. The scaled portion of any pre-tax loss is a function 
of the formula:
and loss recognised only on close out of both positions). But see Rezek et al. v. The Queen, 2005 
DTC 537 (FCA) (rejecting single property characterisation and treating straddle transactions of 
husband and wife as a partnership).
48 See UK Chartered Institute of Taxation, “Overhedging and Underhedging HMRC Technical 
Note August 2009 – Response by the Chartered Institute of Taxation,” 29 September 2009, at 
para 10.1 (characterising as novel the focus of the UK loss limitation on risk transfer rather than 
tax avoidance).
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SP = A x t
where 
SP = the scaled portion of the realized loss
A = the pre-tax loss
t = the tax rate applicable to scaled position giving rise to the pre-tax loss
This kind of loss non-recognition rule could also be one-sided in the sense that any 
gain associated with a targeted transaction would be fully subject to tax at the relevant 
rate. The one-sided nature of this suggested rule would serve as a penalty in an 
attempt to deter scaled hedge transactions and the risk transfer that would otherwise 
occur. As applied to the foreign-currency hedges in examples 1 and 2, the effect of this 
one-sided loss limitation rule on after-tax cash flows of a taxpayer and government 
revenue is summarised in table 10.1 below.
Table 10.1
GBP/JPY -30% -20% -10% -5% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Realised FX 
gain/loss 
(41.70) (27.80) (13.90) (6.95) 6.95 13.90 27.80 41.70
Non-deductible 
loss
(11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 0 0 0 0
Deductible loss (30) (20) (10) (5) 0 0 0 0
Tax payable (8.40) (5.60) (2.80) (1.40) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
Net after-tax (33.30) (22.20) (11.10) (5.55) 5 10 20 30
Unrealised FX 
gain/loss
30 20 10 5 (5) (10) (20) (30)
Tax payable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net after-tax: 
Group X/Y 
(3.30) (2.20) (1.10) (0.55) 0 0 0 0
Net revenue (8.40) (5.60) (2.80) (1.40) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
No loss limitation (Tables 1.1 and 2.1)
Net revenue (11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
Net after-tax: 
Group X/Y 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Because only one side of the offsetting positions in examples 1 and 2 are scaled, the 
suggested loss limitation rule would only apply to this position in the event that 
the GBP depreciated in value against the JPY and a loss was realised. The first four 
columns in table 10.1 indicate the scaled portion of the loss that would be denied 
recognition and would thereby reduce the associated tax saving for different changes 
in value as between the GBP and the JPY. This reduced loss recognition, limited to the 
non-scaled portion of the relevant position, would mean that the consolidated foreign 
exchange gain and loss of the offsetting positions would no longer match, resulting 
in a net after-tax loss for the corporate group shown again in the first four columns 
of table 10.1 for different changes in value of the GBP against the JPY. Government’s 
loss exposure would also be reduced as compared to the case of full loss recognition, 
the results of which are summarised in tables 1.1 and 2.1 and are reproduced at the 
bottom of table 10.1 for comparison purposes. As the last four columns show, the 
full amount of any scaled gain realised if the GBP appreciates against the JPY would 
remain taxable and government’s net revenue would remain the same as shown in 
tables 1.1 and 2.1. There would be a complete matching of the after-tax results in this 
case because the non-scaled position is effectively non-taxable and any offsetting loss 
would not be attributable to scaling. The hedge transaction would presumably not 
be entered into, however, provided the relevant long and short positions were priced 
on market, and there would thus be no way to ensure that unexpected gain and loss 
attributable to changes in relative value as between the GBP and the JPY would arise 
systematically on the same offsetting positions. 
The asymmetric swap in example 3 involves scaling of both offsetting positions such 
that our suggested loss limitation would apply equally to both positions. As with 
the foreign-currency hedges in examples 1 and 2, the loss limitation would alter the 
after-tax offsetting cash flows such that government’s loss exposure would be reduced 
as compared to full recognition of the non-scaled and scaled portion of the losses. 
Application of the loss limitation to the scaled portion of both sides of the asymmetric 
swap means that government revenue increases in the event that the position subject 
to the higher tax rate provides the gain and the position subject to the lower tax rate 
provides the loss. This effect can be seen in the last four columns of table 10.2. 
Table 10.2
Rise/fall 
value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Short swap: 
OBU
525 393.75 262.50 131.25 (131.25) (262.50) (393.75) (525)
Non-deductible 
loss
0 0 0 0 (13.12) (26.25) (39.38) (52.50)
Deductible loss 0 0 0 0 (118.13) (236.25) (354.37) (472.50)
Tax payable 52.50 39.38 26.25 13.13 (11.81) (23.63) (35.44) (47.25)
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Rise/fall 
value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
After-tax 472.50 354.37 236.25 118.12 (119.44) (238.87) (358.31) (477.75)
Long swap: 
DBU
(675) (506.25) (337.50) (168.75) 168.75 337.50 506.25 675
Non-deductible 
loss
(202.50) (152) (101.25) (50.63) 0 0 0 0
Deductible loss (472.50) (354.25) (236.25) (118.12) 0 0 0 0
Tax payable (141.75) (106.25) (70.88) (35.44) 50.63 101.25 151.88 202.50
After-tax (533.25) (400) (266.62) (133.31) 118.12 236.25 354.37 472.50
Net position: 
OBU and DBU
(60.75) (45.63) (30.37) (15.19) (1.32) (2.62) (3.94) (5.25)
Tax payable: 
short swap
52.50 39.38 26.25 13.13 (11.81) (23.63) (35.44) (47.25)
Tax payable: 
long swap
(141.75) (106.25) (70.88) (35.44) 50.63 101.25 151.88 202.50
Net tax payable (89.25) (66.87) (44.63) (22.31) 38.82 78.12 116.44 155
No loss limitation (Table 3.1)
Net position: 
OBU and DBU
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tax payable: 
short swap
52.50 39.38 26.25 13.13 (13.13) (26.25) (39.38) (52.50)
Tax payable: 
long swap
(202.50) (151.88) (101.25) (50.63) 50.63 101.25 151.88 202.50
Net tax payable (150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
The UK loss limitation applicable to “risk-transfer schemes” also disturbs the after-tax 
equivalence of cash flows from offsetting positions that are scaled, which negates the 
transfer of risk to government through the income tax system; it realises this result, 
however, in a manner different from our suggested loss limitation and similar to the 
US straddle legislation, which permits the recognition of realised losses only to the 
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extent that they exceed unrealised gains on an offsetting position.49 The amount of 
the limited losses under the UK legislation is a function of the following formula:50
total scheme loss x ([total scheme loss – total scheme profit] – pre-tax economic loss 
from the scheme/ total realised scheme loss)
“Total scheme loss” and “scheme profit” are amounts realised in the relevant taxation 
year and are defined as those profits and losses that arise from movements in a rate 
or index that is central to the scheme and which arise from a loan relationship or 
derivative contract that, apart from the scheme, would have been brought to account 
within the hedge tax accounting rules.51 “Pre-tax economic loss” is the excess of 
realised and unrealised losses over realised and unrealised gain.52 Any excess of 
realised scheme losses over realised scheme profits may be carried over and deducted 
against scheme profits in a subsequent year.53
The different form of loss limitation under the UK legislation appears to follow from a 
focus on an assumed structuring to otherwise avoid hedge tax accounting treatment. 
By matching the non-scaled portion of a loss with scheme profit, that portion of the 
loss is effectively deducted at the tax rate applicable to gain realised on the offsetting 
position rather than the tax rate at which the loss position was scaled. Realisation of 
offsetting after-tax cash flows and the associated risk transfer requires recognition 
of the full amount of pre-tax gain and loss independently at the asymmetric tax 
rates applicable to the positions. The UK loss limitation rule thus disturbs this 
required recognition by limiting recognition of the non-scaled portion of realised 
loss. The scaled portion of any realised scheme loss reflected in a pre-tax economic 
loss is essentially considered to be unhedged and may be recognised subject to the 
application of any other loss limitation rules. Our suggested loss limitation realises 
a comparable result by limiting recognition of the scaled portion of realised loss. As 
with our suggested loss limitation, the UK rule is also one-sided in the sense that any 
realised gain attributable to the scaled portion of a position must be recognised. 
The effect of the application of the UK loss limitation to the foreign-currency hedge 
transactions in examples 1 and 2 is summarised in table 11.1. It can be seen that, 
as compared to the effect of our suggested loss limitation summarised in table 10.1, 
the UK rule provides more limited revenue exposure and a deeper net loss position 
for the taxpayer in examples 1 and 2, because the whole of the non-scaled portion 
of the scheme loss is denied recognition for the year in the absence of any realised 
scheme profit on the offsetting position. The non-deductible portion of the loss is 
49 IRC, section 1092. Recognition of realised losses is permitted only to the extent that they exceed 
unrealised gain on an offsetting position. Moreover, realised gain on a winning position must 
be recognised in full and is not limited to the excess of such gain over unrecognised loss on 
an offsetting losing position. The basic loss limitation is supplemented with a provision that 
requires the capitalisation of interest and carrying charges related to a straddle. IRC, §263(g).
50 Corporation Tax Act 2010, section 937F(1).
51 Corporation Tax Act 2010, section 937E.
52 Corporation Tax Act 2010, section 937L.
53 Corporation Tax Act 2010, sections 937G and 937H.
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nonetheless available for carryover against any scheme profits realised in subsequent 
taxation years. 
Table 11.1
GBP/JPY -30% -20% -10% -5% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Total scheme 
loss
(41.70) (27.80) (13.90) (6.95) 0 0 0 0
Scheme profit 0 0 0 0 6.95 13.90 27.80 41.70
Pre-tax 
economic loss
(11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 0 0 0 0
Non-deductible 
loss
(30) (20) (10) (5) 0 0 0 0
Deductible loss (11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 0 0 0 0
Net revenue (3.28) (2.18) (1.09) (0.55) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
Net after-tax: 
Group X/Y
(8.42) (5.62) (2.81) (1.40) 0 0 0 0
No loss limitation (Tables 1.1 and 2.1)
Net revenue 
from FX gain/
loss 
(11.70) (7.80) (3.90) (1.95) 1.95 3.90 7.80 11.70
Net after-tax: 
Group X/Y 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The effect of offsetting the non-scaled portion of realised scheme losses against 
realised scheme profits can be seen with the asymmetric swap in example 3 and is 
summarised in table 11.2. Where the scheme loss is realised on the higher-taxed 
position (long swap), the UK loss limitation results in more limited revenue exposure 
and a deeper net loss position for the taxpayer, because it effectively provides a lower 
deduction rate for a larger portion of the loss against scheme profits. Our suggested 
loss limitation would deny recognition of the scaled portion of the loss while allowing 
the non-scaled portion to be deducted at the higher tax rate applicable to the long 
swap. Where the gain is realised on the long swap, our suggested loss limitation would 
result in greater tax payable, because the scaled portion of the realised loss on the 
short swap would be denied recognition. The UK loss limitation effectively permits 
the whole of the loss realised on the short swap to be deducted against realised gain 
on the long swap, with only the excess of the gain subject to tax at the higher tax rate 
applicable to that position.
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Table 11.2
Rise/fall 
value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Short swap: 
OBU
525 393.75 262.50 131.25 (131.25) (262.50) (393.75) (525)
Long swap: 
DBU
(675) (506.25) (337.50) (168.75) 168.75 337.50 506.25 675
Total scheme 
loss
(675) (506.25) (337.50) (168.75) (131.25) (262.50) (393.75) (525)
Scheme profit 525 393.75 262.50 131.25 168.75 337.50 506.25 675
Pre-tax 
economic loss
(150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 0 0 0 0
Deductible loss 
after offset
(150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 0 0 0 0
Tax payable (45) (33.75) (22.50) (11.25) 11.25 22.50 33.75 45
Net position: 
OBU and DBU
(105) (78.25) (52.50) (26.25) 26.25 52.50 78.75 105
No loss limitation (Table 3.1)
Net position: 
OBU and DBU
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tax payable: 
short swap
52.50 39.38 26.25 13.13 (13.13) (26.25) (39.38) (52.50)
Tax payable: 
long swap
(202.50) (151.88) (101.25) (50.63) 50.63 101.25 151.88 202.50
Net tax payable (150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
B Targeting of Loss Denial
Our suggested loss limitation probably differs more importantly from the UK 
rule in its targeting. Consistent with the articulation of the policy problem in the 
immediately previous part of the article, our suggested limitation would focus 
generally on transactions that involve scaling of one or more offsetting positions as 
a means to transfer risk through the income tax system. Similar to the US straddle 
legislation54 and/or hedge transactions eligible for hedge tax accounting treatment, 
54 For an overview of the US straddle legislation, see Peter C. Canellos, “Limitations on Loss 
Recognition,” in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, David B. Newman, and Diane Ring eds., Taxation of 
Financial Instruments (Deerfield, Ill: Clark, Boardman Callaghan) (loose-leaf), chapter 6, at 10-
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affected transactions would be defined in terms of offsetting positions. The principal 
difference with the definition of offsetting positions in these different contexts would 
be the identification of positions with imperfectly offsetting pre-tax cash flows and 
perfectly or near-perfectly offsetting after-tax cash flows.55 
The UK loss limitation focuses on a narrower subset of risk-transfer transactions using 
loans and derivative contracts that result in the acquisition of a financial advantage 
and not just the transfer of risk through the income tax system. In particular, a “risk-
transfer scheme”56 is a scheme that satisfies the following conditions:
• the main purpose of any member of a corporate group entering into 
the scheme is to obtain a “financial advantage,” defined as an increase 
on returns on investments, a reduction in the costs of borrowing, or a 
similar economic impact arising from the combination of the effect of 
the scheme on corporate group members;57
• it is reasonable to assume that the financial advantage could not have 
been obtained without being subject to the “relevant risk,” defined as the 
fluctuation in any index, price or value;58
• the result of entering into the scheme is that the group is not subject to 
the risk; and
• the group would be subject to the risk if the operation of the tax system 
were ignored.
There are arguably two possible, and not necessarily alternative, rationales for this 
more limited focus. One possible rationale is a perceived need to limit compliance 
and administrative costs associated with the identification of offsetting positions. 
Identification costs can, indeed, be severe in the absence of any required identification 
17; and John J. Ensminger, “The Broad but Porous Net of the Straddle Rules: How Long Will the 
Fish Continue to Swim Through?” (1999) 18 Virginia Tax Review 709. 
55 For the most part, the concept of offsetting positions under the US legislation is expressed at a 
general level of principle and appears to have been intentionally left vague. See Canellos, supra 
note 54, at 13-14. The legislation provides only that a taxpayer is considered to hold offsetting 
positions where those positions entail “a substantial diminution of risk of loss” in respect of one 
another. IRC, section 1092(c)(3)(A) provides that positions are presumed to be offsetting where: 
(i) they are in the same personal property (whether established in such property or a contract 
for such property); (ii) they are in the same personal property, even though such property may 
be in altered form; (iii) they are in debt instruments of a similar maturity; (iv) they are sold 
or marketed as offsetting positions; or (v) the aggregate margin requirement for the positions 
is lower than the sum of the margin requirements for each position if held separately. IRC, 
section 1092(c)(3)(A)(vi) provides that positions are presumed to be offsetting if there are such 
other factors (or satisfaction of subjective or objective tests) as the Secretary may by regulations 
prescribe as indicating that such positions are offsetting.
56 Corporation Tax Act 2010, section 937C.
57 Corporation Tax Act 2010, section 937C(6).
58 Corporation Tax Act 2010, section 937C(3).
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of after-tax hedging transactions for financial accounting purposes.59 The limited 
focus of the UK legislation can be seen as an attempt to limit identification costs 
by focusing on structured or tailored transactions, with the presence of a financial 
advantage, along with a transfer of risk through the income tax system, serving as 
a proxy for this set of transactions. Application of the loss limitation rule is further 
limited to loan and derivative contracts, presumably on the empirical assumption 
that such contracts can be scaled relatively easily at low transaction costs.60 Another 
possible rationale also rests on another empirical premise that the adoption of a 
hedge tax accounting regime sufficiently limits the attractiveness of risk-transfer 
transactions as a hedging strategy. More particularly, it may be assumed that, in the 
absence of the acquisition of a financial advantage, taxpayers are disinclined to scale 
positions and will otherwise rely on the timing and character matching provided by 
a hedge tax accounting regime to ensure symmetry of pre-tax and after-tax results.61 
Both of these possible rationales for narrowing the focus of a loss limitation rule are 
problematic.62 As we argued earlier, the presence of a hedge tax accounting regime is, 
in fact, normatively irrelevant to the articulation of the policy problem presented by 
risk-transfer transactions. The same risk transfer effect holds under the conditions 
of the availability of asymmetric tax rates and non-binding loss limitations in the 
absence of a hedge tax accounting regime as in the presence of such a regime that is 
either incomplete in its application or can be avoided. It is simply unclear empirically 
that such a regime sufficiently mutes the incentive to transfer risk through the income 
59 See in this respect, International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Guidance on Implementing 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, 
at para. F.4.1 (“IAS 39 permits, but does not require, assessment of hedge effectiveness on an after-
tax basis. If the hedge is undertaken on an after-tax basis, it is so designated at inception as part of 
the formal documentation of the hedging relationship and strategy.”); and Tony Frost, Jerry Reilly, 
and Emily Kater, Guide to Taxation of Financial Arrangements (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 2009), 
at 363 (noting that the implementation guidance for IAS 39 has no specific Australian equivalent 
but, “in practice, companies and their auditors are expected to have regard to, and apply, IAS 39 
IG.”). See also Feder, supra note 7, at 1615, note 10 (noting that the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) in ACS, para. 815-35-35-3; para. 815-35-35-26, and subpara. 815-20-25-
3(b)(2)(vi), “has expressly recognized that taxpayers may adjust the notional amount of certain 
hedges so that those hedges are effective on an after-tax basis”). Where regulatory constraints 
are non-binding, an ability to offset positions in order to reduce counterparty risk charges to 
regulatory capital can provide assistance in the identification function.
60 See Schizer, supra note 26 (arguing that, in the presence of scaling, gain and loss recognition 
rates on derivatives can be any rate provided that it applies symmetrically).
61 See, for example, Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 37 
(“In practice, whether after-tax hedging should be accepted as a natural consequence of the 
disparate treatment of certain items or should rather be considered as aggressive and challenged 
will depend on a number of elements, including the facts and circumstances of each case, the 
commercial reasons underlying the transactions, and the intent of the applicable domestic law.”).
62 Chartered Institute of Taxation, supra note 48, at para 3.4 (questioning the targeting of 
transactions that transfer risk to the Exchequer only if they provide a financial benefit other 
than a tax benefit).
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tax system where offsetting positions can be constructed such that they are exposed 
to asymmetric tax rates and realised loss on a scaled position is otherwise fully 
deductible in the absence of a binding loss limitation. The presence of a financial 
advantage as defined in the UK legislation represents the more extreme version 
of such transactions,63 but the same ability to transfer risk through the income 
tax system remains for hedge transactions that do not involve the acquisition of a 
financial advantage associated with a scaled position. It would seem that only a range 
of non-tax constraints might constrain the substitution of risk-transfer transactions 
for conventional hedging transactions with offsetting pre-tax cash flows. The 
existence of such constraints would likely have random incidence effects that cannot 
be justified on any policy basis whether or not a hedge tax accounting regime has been 
adopted by tax policymakers. UK Inland Revenue apparently recognises this fact in 
the 2009 budget documents where it is acknowledged that the narrowly-targeted 
loss limitation could be amended in the future to extend to “trading transactions” 
generally.64 This possible extension is now reflected in a regulation-making power 
that permits extension to trading losses on any instruments, and not just loans and 
derivative contracts, of banks, insurance companies or broker-dealers.65
As far as identification costs are concerned, the broader application of our suggested 
loss limitation would entail greater costs comparable perhaps to those associated 
with the US straddle rules.66 That said, the more narrowly targeted UK rule is also 
not without such costs associated with the identification of offsetting positions that 
constitute a scheme.67 Moreover, the identification of a financial advantage imposes 
its own set of identification costs that would not be a part of our suggested limitation. 
63 See, in this respect, Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 7 and 
37 (emphasising that certain risk-transfer transactions are artificial in the sense that there is 
generally no pre-existing exposure to market price risk, but rather such risk is created as part of 
the relevant scheme).
64 Technical Note, supra note 10, at 7 (indicating consideration of extension of proposed loss 
limitation to trading transactions involving instruments other than loan relationships and 
derivative contracts as part of a risk-transfer scheme).
65 Corporation Tax Act 2010, section 937O.
66 See, for example Canellos, supra note 54, at 14 (“... the IRS faces enormous problems in applying 
the straddle rules since it has no effective way of identifying offsetting positions without being 
tipped off by the taxpayer.”). Special disclosure rules supported by penalties for non-disclosure 
have been used in an attempt to address the identification problem. IRC, section 1092(a)(3)
(B) and former section 6653(f). However, as Canellos notes, straddle issues have historically 
been raised on audit where: (i) the taxpayer has elected to treat an offsetting position as a 
qualifying hedge within the exception from the straddle rules; or (ii) the taxpayer has designated 
a transaction as a hedge for financial accounting purposes. In both instances, the IRS has notice 
of the offsetting nature of two or more positions and can challenge their characterisation as 
qualifying hedges for tax purposes. The alternative is treatment as a straddle.
67 See, for example, Hollis, supra note 30, at 449-50 (describing some modifications of the 
transactional examples in the Technical Note suggesting that the conditions of application of 
the UK loss limitation rules may not be satisfied). See also Chartered Institute of Taxation, supra 
note 48, at para 6.2.
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For example, although the presence of the lower borrowing cost associated with the 
foreign-currency hedge in example 1 and the increased return associated with the 
foreign-currency hedge in example 2, arguably constitute a financial benefit, it is not 
clear that the same conclusion can be drawn with the asymmetric swap in example 3. 
This transaction would seem to be subject to the UK rule only if it can be concluded 
that the fee earned for providing the long and short swaps constitutes an economic 
impact similar to an increase on investment or a reduction in borrowing costs arising 
from the effect of the scheme on corporate group members and that could not have 
been obtained without being subject to the relevant market risk. These conditions of 
application are not self-executing and impose identification costs associated with the 
necessary interpretative exercise.68
Costliness of the identification function is clearly most severe in a cross-border context 
implicating multiple taxing jurisdictions because of the assumption of offsetting 
positions by members of the same corporate group subject to different tax rates in 
different jurisdictions. In fact, this environment commonly provides the necessary 
conditions for tax-driven scaling of offsetting positions characteristic of risk-transfer 
transactions. In some instances, transactions are structured to take advantage of these 
conditions. In other instances, however, there may be factors, such as the facilitation 
of the risk management function through a centralised centre of a corporate group, 
that dictate hedging strategies implemented in multiple jurisdictions. In these 
circumstances, the motivation for tax-effective hedging may not be the ability to 
transfer risk through the income tax system by scaling of offsetting positions subject 
to different tax rates. Any resultant risk transfer may be entirely incidental to the need 
to hedge, on a tax-effective basis, market risk located in different tax jurisdictions. 
Whatever its form of loss denial or targeting dimensions, a loss limitation affecting 
a range of risk-transfer transactions must extend to positions assumed by two or 
more members of the same corporate group or “affiliated,” “related” or “associated” 
persons;69 otherwise, the limitation is too easily avoided. A focus on risk-transfer 
transactions that are structured to provide a financial benefit may serve as a proxy for 
the identification of offsetting positions that are assumed by different members of the 
same group in order to ensure that the positions are subject to asymmetric tax rates. 
Where the acquisition of a financial benefit is not present, such structuring may be 
tolerated on the basis that the risk transfer from scaling is diffused among multiple tax 
jurisdictions. Nonetheless, this is arguably a less than compelling reason to prevent 
the unilateral adoption and application of a loss limitation rule as a response to the 
68 Hollis, supra note 30, at 449-50.
69 See Technical Note, supra note 10, at 3 (“These transactions are structured to create a mix of 
assets and liabilities whose values are subject to opposing movements, normally across a number 
of group entities.”); and IRC, section 1092(d)(4) (treating taxpayer as holding positions of spouse, 
other members of a consolidated corporate group and certain partnerships and trusts for the 
purpose of the straddle rules).
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partial risk transfer that is implicated in one of the jurisdictions.70 Our suggested loss 
limitation would apply therefore to deny recognition of the scaled portion of a realised 
loss without accounting for the offsetting position in another jurisdiction. Similarly, 
a UK-style loss limitation applied to risk-transfer transactions generally should deny 
recognition of the non-scaled portion of a loss realised by a UK taxpayer without any 
offset for scheme gain realised in another jurisdiction. In both instances, there are 
compliance and administration costs associated with the need to identify offsetting 
positions in a foreign jurisdiction. Foreign-information reporting requirements are 
obviously needed to ensure appropriate enforcement of the loss limitation.
V Limited Application of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Rules 
and/or Doctrines
In the absence of some form of targeted loss limitation, risk-transfer transactions can 
be used to transfer market risk to government through the income tax system. In this 
legislative environment, the principal tax constraint on such transactions for some 
corporate taxpayers is the binding nature of generalised loss limitations applicable 
to non-capital losses. Anti-tax-avoidance rules and/or doctrines are ineffective to 
address a broad range of risk-transfer transactions. The ineffectiveness is attributable 
to the standard requirement that a particular transaction must be implemented 
with the purpose of providing a tax benefit narrowly construed as “a reduction, 
avoidance or deferral of tax payable.”71 The transfer of market risk to government 
through the income tax system realised by risk-transfer transactions generally does 
not fit readily within this requirement. Although the deductibility of a loss realised 
on one of the positions constituting a risk-transfer transaction can be considered 
a tax benefit narrowly construed, the transaction will inevitably fail the required 
purpose condition. In particular, a taxpayer implementing a risk-transfer transaction 
is indifferent to the direction of price movements on the underlying market risk 
such that the location of gain and loss on the relevant positions is irrelevant to the 
effectiveness of the transaction. This indifference to the location of offsetting gain 
and loss makes it difficult to conclude that the transaction was entered into for the 
purpose of accessing a loss deduction.
As illustrated by the transactions in examples 1 and 2 (and perhaps example 3), a risk-
transfer transaction can be structured to provide a financial benefit in addition to a 
tax-effective hedge. But again, without any directional bias in the price movements of 
the underlying market risk, it is difficult to conclude that the particular transaction 
was entered into to provide a tax benefit in the form of a loss deduction. This leaves 
70 Acting unilaterally in adopting a binding loss limitation would be problematic if it were to cause 
risk-transfer transactions to migrate to other jurisdictions without a loss limitation and such 
migration resulted in pooling of correlated risks in a smaller number of jurisdictions.
71 See Hollis, supra note 30, at 446 (“Such transactions [risk-transfer transactions] do not obviously 
constitute ‘avoidance’: the Exchequer suffers a loss of revenue if exchange rates move in one 
direction; equally, however, it benefits if they move in the other.”).
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the application of anti-tax-avoidance rules and/or doctrines to a limited range of tax-
driven transactions that are, in fact, structured such that there is a directional bias 
locating deductible loss in a tax-effective manner or, alternatively, that are structured 
to provide a tax benefit in some other form. We highlight in this part of the paper the 
limited range of risk-transfer transactions entered into with the purpose of providing 
a tax benefit narrowly construed as “a reduction, avoidance, or deferral of tax or 
other amount payable … or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount payable 
…” 72 Application of anti-tax-avoidance rules and/or doctrines to deny the benefit 
associated with this limited range of risk-transfer transactions in no way focuses on 
the transfer of risk that is the result of the scaling of offsetting positions. Any resultant 
denial of loss recognition must be predicated instead on the presence of a tax benefit 
narrowly construed that is the dominant purpose of the transaction. 
This limited nature of the possible application of anti-tax-avoidance rules and/or 
doctrines to this subset of risk-transfer transactions is evident in TD 2010/12. We 
first describe below two examples of risk-transfer transactions entered into for the 
purpose of providing a tax benefit. The description of these illustrative transactions is 
followed by a review of the analysis in TD 2010/12 supporting the application of Part 
IVA to the asymmetric swap in example 3. We suggest that this application requires 
a factual finding that the structuring of the relevant transaction is such that there is a 
directional bias in the price movement of the underlying market risk such that realised 
loss is deductible at a higher tax rate and realised gain on the offsetting position is 
taxed at a lower rate. The target ineffectiveness of anti-tax-avoidance rules and/or 
doctrines as a generalised response to risk-transfer transactions is thus relatively 
obvious. Adoption of a broad loss limitation targeting a wide range of risk-transfer 
transactions can address many, but not necessarily all, of those transactions entered 
into with the dominant purpose of providing a tax benefit. With either an anti-tax-
avoidance rule or a loss limitation rule, tax administrators must find factually that the 
component parts of a composite transaction are sufficiently linked to be treated as a 
single transaction. That is, of course, the only feature that these legislative responses 
share.
A Tri-party Residual Market Risk Swap/Constructive Sale
Example 10
Bankco owns a block of 1 million shares of a venture start-up company currently 
trading at $17 per share. To hedge a large accrued gain on the shares, Bankco enters 
into a “Tri-party Residual Market Risk Swap” under which: (i) a subsidiary of Bankco 
(Subco 1) enters into a prepaid, cash-settled forward contract with an unrelated hedge 
fund to sell 1.67 million of the shares of the venture start-up company; and (ii) a 
subsidiary of Bankco (Subco 2) enters into a forward contract with the hedge fund to 
72 Income Tax Act (Canada), RSC, 1985, c. 1 (as amended), subsection 245(1) definition of a “tax 
benefit.” See, in this respect, Australian Treasury Department, Improving the Operation of the 
Anti-Avoidance Provisions in the Income Tax Law (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
Discussion Paper, November 2010), at 5-8.
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purchase 1.67 million shares of the venture start-up company. Subco 1 is resident in 
foreign country A and is subject to a 10 percent tax rate. Subco 2 is resident in foreign 
country B and is subject to a 45 percent tax rate. Bankco is subject to a 41.5 percent 
tax rate in its country of residence. 
Figure 4
Subco 1 Subco 2
short prepaid
forward
long forward
VC shares
Hedge fund
Bankco
The transaction in example 10 is a “constructive sale” or “monetisation transaction” 
whereby Bankco eliminates all exposure to future movements in the price of the 
block of shares it owns while locking in the accrued gain. As a matter of legal form, 
however, Bankco does not sell the shares and, in the absence of a targeted constructive 
sale rule,73 may be able to defer tax payable that would otherwise arise on a transfer 
of the ownership of the shares as a disposition. More particularly, the combination 
73 See, for example, IRC, section 1259; and ITAA, 1997, Draft Subdivision 230-J-Special integrity 
measures (deemed disposal). See also Anschutz Co. v CIR, 664 F. 3d 313, 2011 (10th Cir.); aff ’g 
135 TC 78, 2010 (TC) (shares subject to variable prepaid forward contract considered to be 
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of the short prepaid forward contract and the long forward eliminates all exposure 
of Bankco to unexpected gain or loss on its ownership of the block of shares of the 
venture start-up company. This result is realised by constructing the hedge on an after-
tax basis using the two subsidiaries subject to different tax rates, rather than Bankco 
entering into a forward sale of the shares that would eliminate unexpected gain or 
loss on a pre-tax basis. In this respect, the transaction in example 10 is a risk-transfer 
transaction comparable to the foreign-currency hedges in examples 1 and 2 and the 
asymmetric swap in example 3. Risk associated with the long position in the shares of 
the venture start-up company is effectively transferred to the three tax jurisdictions 
in which Bankco and the subsidiaries are resident as a function of the difference in 
tax rates and scaling of the offsetting positions. Given the specified tax rates in the 
three tax jurisdictions, the number of shares over which the scaled offsetting forward 
contracts are written can be determined as follows:
Let X = the number of shares held by Bankco
Let Y = the number of shares over which the forward contracts are to be written
therefore (X – 0.415X) + (Y – 0.45Y) = (Y – 0.10Y) 
and solving for Y
0.585X + 0.55Y = 0.9Y
0.585X = 0.9Y – 0.55Y
0.585X = 0.35Y
0.585/0.35X = Y
1.67X = Y
The after-tax positions of Bankco, Subco1 and Subco2 are summarised in table 12, 
along with the tax payable in each of the three jurisdictions and the net tax payable 
by the corporate group. On a consolidated basis, tax-driven scaling of the respective 
share positions ensures that gain and loss attributable to subsequent movements in the 
price of the shares offsets perfectly after tax. Net tax payable for the corporate group 
equals the gain or loss on the shares owned by Bankco attributable to the same price 
movements. Risk associated with the ownership of the shares is thereby transferred to 
the respective governments. The particular allocation of the revenue amounts among 
the three tax jurisdictions, and the particular allocation of the risk, depends on the 
particular movement in the price of the shares. 
disposed of under a “benefit and burden” analysis of ownership where the taxpayer provided a 
securities lending facility to the long forward counterparty enabling a short sale of the shares to 
hedge its long position).
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Table 12
Rise/fall value 
of shares
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Bankco (17) (12.75) (8.50) (4.25) 4.25 8.50 12.75 17
Tax payable (7.06) (5.29) (3.53) (1.76) 1.76 3.53 5.29 7.06
After-tax (9.94) (7.46) (4.97) (2.49) 2.49 4.97 7.46 9.94
Short forward: 
Subco1
28.39 21.29 14.19 7.10 (7.10) (14.19) (21.29) (28.39)
Tax payable 2.84 2.13 1.42 0.71 (0.71) (1.42) (2.13) (2.84)
After-tax 25.55 19.16 12.77 6.39 (6.39) (12.77) (19.16) (25.55)
Long forward: 
Subco2
(28.39) (21.29) (14.19) (7.10) 7.10 14.19 21.29 28.39
Tax payable (12.78) (9.58) (6.39) (3.20) 3.20 6.39 9.58 12.78
After-tax (15.61) (11.71) (7.8) (3.90) 3.90 7.8 11.71 15.61
Consolidated 
after-tax position
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net tax payable (17) (12.75) (8.50) (4.25) 4.25 8.50 12.75 17
This ability to economically dispose of the shares without a disposition for tax 
purposes is clearly a tax benefit in the form of a deferral of tax payable, and anti-
tax-avoidance rules and/or doctrines could be applied to deny the benefit where the 
transaction can be identified and can be characterised as implemented to access the 
deferral. In general, this requires a factual finding that the different components in 
the transactions are linked in a way that they can be characterised as a composite 
transaction undertaken to provide the tax deferral. For example, as already noted, the 
transaction may be structured to avoid realisation-based recognition of gain defined 
in terms of a formal sale as a matter of non-tax law, or to avoid the application of a 
constructive sale rule that otherwise extends the concept of a realisation event beyond 
a formal sale, but is based on the existence of offsetting pre-tax rather than after-
tax cash flows. The constructive sale may be undertaken, however, not to defer tax 
payable on accrued gain, but rather to avoid regulatory or other non-tax restrictions 
on any sale of the shares. Where the transaction is tax-motivated, general anti-tax-
avoidance rules and/or doctrines are required to address it in the country of residence 
of Bankco. A loss limitation rule applicable to risk-transfer transactions more broadly 
would have no impact because of the location of both offsetting gain and loss in 
another tax jurisdiction.
366 (2013) 28 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM
B Loss Freshening/Loss Transfer
Example 11
Profitco enters into a swap (“the short swap”) with offshore bank whereby Profitco 
will receive the percentage decrease in value and must pay the percentage increase 
in value of a $675m notional amount of a specified equity index. At the same time, 
Loss Sub, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Profitco, enters into a swap (“the long swap”) 
with offshore bank whereby Loss Sub will receive the percentage increase in value and 
must pay the percentage decrease in value of a $472.50m notional amount of the same 
specified equity index. Profitco is subject to a 30 percent tax rate. Loss Sub is subject to 
a 10 percent tax rate but has a substantial amount of loss carryforwards which make 
it effectively non-taxable.
Figure 5
Profitco Third-country
Bank
Loss Sub
short swap equity
index 675m
notional amount
long swap equity
index 472.50m
notional amount
The risk-transfer transaction in example 11 uses an asymmetric swap similar to that 
in example 3 to refresh expiring loss carryovers and transfer them cross-border.74 
Loss Sub uses its loss carryovers against any realised gain on the long swap and 
transfers a portion of those carryovers to Profitco in the form of a realised loss on the 
short swap. This result occurs provided that the equity price index appreciates so that 
Profitco realises loss on the short swap and Loss Sub realises gain on the long swap. 
As summarised in table 13, the net pre-tax exposure to the equity index in example 
11 is $202.50m, but the position of Profitco is scaled such that the after-tax cash flows 
74 See Corporate Loss Utilisation, supra note 4, at 51-52.
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offset on a consolidated basis. Because Profitco has entered into the offsetting short 
swap, appreciation in the index results in a realised loss that is offset on an after-tax 
basis with a gain realised by Loss Sub. Loss carryovers available to Loss Sub provide 
an effective non-taxable status such that its long swap is not scaled to account for a 
positive tax rate. Any gain realised on this position is offset with the loss carryovers, 
while effectively transferring a portion of those losses to Profitco on its offsetting short 
position. If the equity index declines in value, Profitco will realise gain on the short 
position which is offset on an after-tax basis with realised loss on the long position 
held by Loss Sub. The effective non-taxable position of Loss Sub means that the pre-
tax amount of the realised loss equals the after-tax amount.
Table 13
Rise/fall 
value of 
equity 
index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Short swap: 
Profitco
675 506.25 337.50 168.75 (168.75) (337.50) (506.25) (675)
Tax payable 202.50 151.88 101.25 50.62 (50.62) (101.25) (151.88) (202.50)
After-tax 472.50 354.37 236.25 118.13 (118.13) (236.25) (354.37) (472.50)
Long swap: 
Loss Sub
(472.50) (354.37) (236.25) (118.13) 118.13 236.25 354.37 472.50
Tax payable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
After-tax (472.50) (354.37) (236.25) (118.13) 118.13 236.25 354.37 472.50
Consolidated 
position
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This ability to refresh the loss carryovers of Loss Sub and transfer them cross-border 
to Profitco is clearly a tax benefit in the form of the loss deduction, and anti-tax-
avoidance rules and/or doctrines could be applied to deny the benefit where the 
transaction can be characterised as implemented to provide the deduction. As with 
the constructive sale in example 10, this requires a factual finding that the different 
components in the transactions are connected in a way that they can be characterised 
as a composite transaction undertaken to provide a tax benefit – in this case, the 
loss deduction by Profitco. It also requires a factual finding that the transaction is 
priced off-market in such a way that there is a directional bias in the movements of the 
underlying equity index that ensures loss is realised on the short swap by Profitco and 
offsetting gain is realised by Loss Sub on the long swap. For example, the transaction 
could be characterised as a non-tax driven hedge, with transfer of risk through the 
income tax system, if the realistically expected bounds of subsequent movements in 
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the equity price index extended to declines such that loss would be realised by Loss 
Sub and gain by Profitco. 
In contrast with the constructive sale in example 10, a broad loss limitation targeting 
risk-transfer transactions could ensure that the loss transfer transaction in example 
11 is ineffective, whether or not it is structured to provide a tax benefit in the form of 
the location of the loss deduction in Profitco. Such a rule would equally apply to deny 
loss recognition to a risk-transfer transaction that is a tax-driven loss transfer or a 
risk-transfer transaction in which the taxpayers transfer risk through the income tax 
system but are indifferent as to where gain or loss is located. In the latter instance, the 
transaction would be priced on-market which would mean that there should be no 
directional bias in price movements of the underlying equity index.
C Asymmetric Swap with a Drift Adjustment – TD 2010/12
Where the tax benefit associated with a risk-transfer transaction is a loss deduction, 
the significance of a factual finding that its location is predetermined because of a 
directional bias is evident in TD 2010/12. In this respect, the asymmetric swap that 
is the subject of the taxation determination is similar to that in example 11, but 
with an additional feature referred to as “the drift adjustment.” In fact, the taxation 
determination identifies two possible tax benefits: 
• the deduction of the amount of the drift adjustment by resident bank; 
and
• the deduction of realised loss on the long swap position by resident bank. 
Nonetheless, as with the transaction in example 11, the finding of a tax benefit and a 
dominant purpose to access that benefit depends critically on a factual finding that 
the swap is structured such that loss is, more likely than not, to arise in the higher-
taxed DBU, while gain arises in the lower-taxed OBU. The location of loss and gain 
in this way occurs provided that the equity index moves within expected bounds. 
The presence of the drift adjustment does nothing more than amplify the expected 
amounts within these expected bounds. Risk is thus transferred to government 
through the income tax system with the additional benefit of a tax benefit in the 
form of location of the loss side of the transaction in the higher-taxed member of the 
corporate group.
There is considerable discussion in TD2010/12 of the characterisation of the 
asymmetric swap as a “scheme” for the purpose of Part IVA: that is, a composite 
transaction sufficiently linked to be treated as a single transaction. Although this 
characterisation is not without its own difficulties in the application of a general 
anti-tax-avoidance rule or a broad loss limitation of the type we suggest, we prefer 
to focus on what we believe is the more conceptually problematic aspect of the 
taxation determination for the point we want to make in this part of the article: 
that is, the finding that the asymmetric swap was entered into with the dominant 
purpose of providing a tax benefit. It is this requirement that limits considerably the 
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relevance of general anti-tax-avoidance rules and/or doctrines as a response to risk-
transfer transactions and that is especially problematic in the context of the taxation 
determination.
As noted already, TD 2010/12 posits both a wide and a narrow interpretation 
of the concept of a tax benefit in the context of the asymmetric swap. The narrow 
interpretation focuses on the presence of the drift adjustment. In essence, this added 
feature is intended to replicate the cash flows associated with a total-return equity 
swap and, in effect, provide a measure of market neutrality that would otherwise be 
reflected in the forward price of the relevant index. In particular, futures parity, as an 
arbitrage pricing relationship, posits that the forward price of an asset is a function 
of the spot price and the cost of carry less any expected returns on the asset.75 
Accordingly, market neutrality is realised in the sense that the price of a current or 
deferred purchase of an asset is equivalent and there are no arbitrage opportunities. 
With an equity swap, the same result is realised by the long equity receiver paying 
the short equity payer an interest amount determined as a percentage of the notional 
principal, and the short equity payer paying the long equity receiver any dividends 
received on the notional amount of the basket of shares that are the subject of the 
swap. The long equity receiver receives an amount equal to any appreciation in value 
of the referenced shares over the term of the swap, and the short equity payer receives 
an amount equal to the decline in value of the referenced shares over the term of 
the swap. 
This same feature is replicated with the asymmetric swap that is the subject of TD 
2010/12 by having the resident bank effectively pay the non-resident bank, in the 
form of an adjustment to their respective obligations, a fixed percentage of the net 
75 This relationship between spot and forward prices can be seen most obviously when it is 
recognised that the prospective purchaser of an asset has a simple choice: purchase the asset 
now at its spot price or take future delivery at the forward price. In either case, the purchaser will 
acquire the same asset but with two important differences that together determine the forward 
price. First, because a forward purchaser does not take immediate delivery, he has the use of the 
funds that would have been required to purchase the asset at its spot price and can earn a return 
on those funds. Second, the forward purchaser forgoes any return on the asset in the period 
before purchase. Arbitrage trading ensures that there is no difference in the return available 
from the purchase of an asset immediately at its spot price and its acquisition at some time in the 
future at a forward price. Accordingly, the forward price of an asset is a function of the spot price 
multiplied by the implicit cost of carry (or the riskless rate of return that the forward purchaser 
can earn) less the expected amount of the return on a long position in the asset. This relationship 
can be expressed as:
 forward price = spot price x (1 + rf)t/(1 + rpv)t
 where rf is the riskless interest rate for the term of the forward contract represented by t and rpv 
is the present value of the return on an asset forgone by a forward purchaser.
 The relationship between spot and forward prices for commodities is complicated by the fact 
that the forward purchaser does not incur storage costs but forgoes the convenience yield from 
actually possessing the commodity. These two factors must also be accounted for in determining 
the forward price.
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long exposure to the equity index, presumably determined as the cost of carry of 
the notional amount of the index less any expected dividends on the relevant shares. 
But rather than have the amount determined as a fixed percentage of the net long 
exposure, it is determined by netting out a fixed percentage amount on the short swap 
and a fixed percentage amount on the long swap. Because of scaling of the offsetting 
positions, this pricing form ensures that the drift adjustment is effectively paid by 
government through the income tax system. Assume, for example, that an equity 
receiver would be required to pay 5 percent of any long position. The resident bank in 
example 3 would therefore have to pay the non-resident bank 7.5m over the term of 
the swap, which is 5 percent of the net long exposure to the specified equity index of 
150m under the asymmetric swap. This result is realised, however, by resident bank 
paying 33.75m, which is 5 percent of the 675m notional amount of the long swap, 
and by non-resident bank paying 26.25m, which is 5 percent of the 525m notional 
amount of the short swap. Netting the two amounts, resident bank pays non-resident 
bank 7.5m over the term of the swap. This result, under various movements in the 
equity index, is summarised in table 14.1. The opposite net position of non-resident 
bank is summarised in table 14.2. The position of government is summarised in table 
14.3 where it can be seen that the drift adjustment, as well as the risk associated with 
the net long position assumed by resident bank, is transferred through the income 
tax system. 
Table 14.1: Resident Bank
Rise/fall 
value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Short swap 
525m
525 393.75 262.50 131.25 (131.25) (262.50) (393.75) (525)
Drift adjustment 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25
Net gain/loss 551.25 420 288.75 157.50 (105) (236.25) (367.50) (498.75)
Tax payable 
@10%
55.13 42 28.88 15.75 (10.50) (23.63) (36.75) (49.88)
After-tax 496.12 378 259.87 141.75 (94.50) (212.62) (330.75) (448.87)
Long swap 
675m
(675) (506.25) (337.50) (168.75) 168.75 337.50 506.25 675
Drift adjustment (33.75) (33.75) (33.75) (33.75) (33.75) (33.75) (33.75) (33.75)
Net gain/loss (708.75) (540) (371.25) (202.50) 135 303.75 472.50 641.25
Tax payable 
@30%
(212.63) (162) (111.38) (60.75) 40.50 91.13 141.75 192.38
After-tax (496.12) (378) (259.87) (141.75) 94.50 212.62 330.75 448.87
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Consolidated 
position
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 14.2: Non-resident Bank
Rise/fall value 
of equity 
index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Long position: 
150m
(150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
Long swap: 
525m
(525) (393.75) (262.50) (131.25) 131.25 262.50 393.75 525
Drift adjustment (26.25) (26.25) (26.25) (26.25) (26.25) (26.25) (26.25) (26.25)
Short swap: 
675m
675 506.25 337.50 168.75 (168.75) (337.50) (506.25) (675)
Drift adjustment 33.75 33.75 33.75 33.75 33.75 33.75 33.75 33.75
Net position 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50
Table 14.3: Government Revenue
Rise/fall value 
of equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Short swap: tax 
with drift
55.13 42 28.88 15.75 (10.50) (23.63) (36.75) (49.88)
Long swap: tax 
with drift
(212.63) (162) (111.38) (60.75) 40.50 91.13 141.75 192.38
Net tax with drift (157.50) (120) (82.50) (45) 30 67.50 105 142.50
Net tax 
without drift 
(150) (112.50) (75) (37.50) 37.50 75 112.50 150
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We have argued that the transfer of risk to government through the income tax 
system, which is the result of scaling of offsetting positions, presents a policy problem 
that requires a targeted response. The transfer of payment of the drift adjustment 
through the income tax system using the same technique is conceptually similar and 
also requires a targeted response in the form of a loss limitation. But unless it can 
be concluded that the pricing of the swap is off-market such that the realised loss 
is located in the higher-taxed DBU of the resident bank, it is difficult to conclude 
that the swap is entered into with the dominant purpose of providing a tax benefit, 
narrowly construed, and defined for the purpose of Part IVA as an “amount that is not 
assessable if it would have been assessable if the scheme had not been entered into, or 
a deduction that is allowable to a taxpayer in a taxation year if the deduction would 
not have been available if the scheme had not been entered into.”76 
More particularly, the asymmetric swap could be considered to be entered into for 
the dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit in the form of a deductible loss only 
if it is reasonably certain that the loss is isolated in the higher-taxed resident bank’s 
DBU and the offsetting gain is isolated in the lower-taxed OBU. This result can be 
realised only if the forward price embedded in the transaction, or the drift adjustment 
as a proxy for such a price, is off market. Otherwise, there would be no directional 
bias that would support a conclusion that loss and gain are allocated in a way that 
the transaction could be considered to be entered into to generate loss in a tax-
advantageous manner. Yet TD2010/12 strains to characterise the location of income 
deductions, both realised loss and the drift adjustment, in a tax-driven manner as 
between the higher-taxed resident bank’s DBU and the lower-taxed OBU.
At paragraph 47 of TD 2010/12, the Commissioner expresses the view that: “A simple 
approach may be to identify the drift adjustment as the tax benefit because it is a 
fixed and determined amount that is agreed upfront.” In this regard, the taxation 
determination states that, regardless of the way the index moves, the drift adjustment 
causes the assessable income of the resident bank to be lower, or the allowable 
deductions to be higher by the amount of the drift adjustment. This is certainly 
correct and can be seen in table 14.3 by comparing the net tax with and without 
the drift adjustment. Irrespective of movements in the equity index, net tax payable 
is either 7.50m less or the tax saving is 7.50m greater with the drift adjustment. 
However, this would be entirely the same result if, instead of the drift adjustment, the 
offsetting positions were priced on the basis of on-market forward prices.77 Indeed, if 
the amount of the drift adjustment is on-market in the sense that it is a reflection of 
forward prices, net tax payable summarised in table 14.3 would be exactly the same 
as it is with the drift adjustment. This result is summarised in table 14.4 where it is 
76 ITAA 1997, section 177C.
77 See, in this respect, Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 27 
(observing that the effect of an asymmetric swap with a drift adjustment can be replicated as an 
investment in shares with a value linked to a benchmark index, with the benchmark index also 
being the object of a forward purchase agreement with an over-hedge).
373Using the income tax system as yoUr hedge coUnterparty
assumed that the on-market forward price of the index equals the current spot price 
(525m short position and 675m long position) plus five percent.
Table 14.4
Rise/fall 
value of 
equity index
-100% -75% -50% -25% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Short forward 
551.25m
Net gain/loss 551.25 420 288.75 157.50 (105) (236.25) (367.50) (498.75)
Tax payable 
@10%
55.13 42 28.88 15.75 (10.50) (23.63) (36.75) (49.88)
After-tax 496.12 378 259.87 141.75 (94.50) (212.62) (330.75) (448.87)
Long swap 
708.75m
Net gain/loss (708.75) (540) (371.25) (202.50) 135 303.75 472.50 641.25
Tax payable 
@30%
(212.63) (162) (111.38) (60.75) 40.50 91.13 141.75 192.38
After-tax (496.12) (378) (259.87) (141.75) 94.50 212.62 330.75 448.87
Consolidated 
position
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net tax payable (157.50) (120) (82.50) (45) 30 67.50 105 142.50
It is difficult to conclude, therefore, that the location of the drift adjustment as a 
deductible amount is tax-driven. This conclusion could only be reached if it could 
be determined factually that the pricing of the transaction - either in the form of 
forward prices or spot prices plus the drift adjustment - was off-market and thereby 
amplified the deduction for the resident bank’s DBU. In this case, Part IVA could 
be applied to deny the deduction of loss attributable to the drift adjustment. The 
taxation determination appears to acknowledge this proposition at paragraph 27 
where it is stated that: “… it has been suggested the drift adjustment ensures that 
when the swaps are entered into, there is a neutral expectation of the value of the 
benchmark index rising or falling over the term of the swap by removing any bias 
for profits to accrue in either the Australian resident company’s DBU or its OBU.” 
But the non-tax significance of the drift adjustment is apparently denied when this 
statement is followed by the proposition in paragraph 28 that: “At day 1 of the swap 
the shares that comprise the index will have a market price. The past performance of 
the shares is already embedded in their market price.” This statement simply ignores 
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the arbitrage pricing relationship that is the basis of forward prices, with the use of the 
drift adjustment as a proxy for such prices.78
At paragraphs 48 to 50, the taxation determination expands on what it considers to 
be a tax benefit when it is concluded that any deduction that arises because of the 
net swap position is a tax benefit: that is, whenever the increase in the index is less 
than the drift percentage of 5 percent, or there is a decrease in the index, there would 
be a net tax benefit because a net loss is generated. On this characterisation of the 
asymmetric swap, the entire amount of any deductible loss, and not just the drift 
adjustment, would be denied. Although somewhat unclear, the apparent reasoning 
for this wider interpretation is that the asymmetric swap is a structured transaction 
that, for the following reasons, is priced off-market79 and is therefore not part of a 
broader scheme:
• a reasonable person might expect that if the scheme had not been entered 
into or carried out, no similar transaction, or perhaps any transaction, 
would have been entered into or carried out;
• one would not expect the parties to enter into an asymmetric swap which 
lacked the drift adjustment;
• without the drift adjustment, the payment of the fees at non-commercial 
rates would not be possible; and
• without the drift adjustment, the non-resident counterparty could not 
have obtained the net short exposure to the index at the non-arms length 
price obtained in the asymmetric swap scheme.
Again, these stated reasons appear to ignore the use of the drift adjustment as a proxy 
for on-market forward prices. Indeed, offsetting forward contracts could be used to 
realise much the same risk transfer as the asymmetric swap. A net payment would 
be made between the counterparties only if the forwards were off-market and the 
payments served to ensure that they are on-market. Moreover, the payment of fees at 
non-commercial rates could simply be attributable to the fact that the resident bank 
need not incur the costs to hedge the position it assumes because it has structured 
the transaction to transfer its exposure through the income tax system. But scaling in 
that sense does not necessarily support a conclusion that the transaction was entered 
into with the dominant purpose of providing a tax benefit narrowly construed. That 
conclusion can only be supported by a drift adjustment that does not reflect on-
78 See, in this respect, Aggressive Tax Planning based on After-Tax Hedging, supra note 4, at 29 
(“The purported neutrality of the drift adjustment is artificial, basically, because it would imply 
that the value at inception of the positions taken by each participant (on a stand-alone basis) 
should have been determined or evaluated on the basis of a theoretical approach not acceptable 
or shared in the financial market at arm’s length and commonly referred to as the “nonarbitrage 
theory.”).
79 Ibid., at 33 (noting that a transfer-pricing or profit allocation adjustment may be used to address 
asymmetric swaps that entail deliberate mispricing).
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market forward prices and thereby provides a directional bias to locate deductible 
loss in the DBU of resident bank.
VI  Conclusion
Tax policymakers should consider adoption of a generalised loss limitation applicable 
to risk-transfer transactions involving imperfectly offsetting pre-tax cash flows but 
perfectly (or near perfectly) offsetting after-tax cash flows. There is no apparent 
market failure that would suggest government should perform a risk-bearing role 
in this context; moreover, the performance of that role is entirely random given the 
necessary requirement that corporate taxpayers do not face otherwise binding loss 
limitations. Nonetheless, the fragmentary transactional evidence, combined with 
costliness of the identification exercise associated with a broad loss limitation and 
perceptions of a negative impact on the decision to hedge, may support adoption 
of a more narrowly focused loss limitation. In that case, tax policymakers and tax 
administrators need to distinguish clearly three types of risk-transfer transactions:
• risk-transfer transactions that do not provide a financial benefit other 
than the transfer of risk to government through the income tax system;
• risk-transfer transactions that provide a financial benefit other than a tax 
benefit; and
• risk-transfer transactions that provide a tax benefit.
The second type of transaction is the target of the loss limitation recently adopted 
by UK Inland Revenue; it can be justified to the extent that factors, such as the 
presence of a financial benefit, can be relied on as proxies for structured risk-transfer 
transactions which do not entail the same level of identification costs associated with 
risk-transfer transactions generally. Moreover, given that this subset of transactions 
are often substituted for hedge transactions that do not transfer risk to government, 
any negative impact on the decision to hedge may arguably be avoided. But this 
kind of more limited approach requires that tax administrators use general anti-tax-
avoidance rules and/or doctrines to address risk-transfer transactions that provide a 
tax benefit, narrowly construed, and not necessarily a financial benefit. The conceptual 
difficulties in applying this approach are readily apparent in TD 2010/12.

